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INITIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE POSSIBLE




The failure of systemically important financial institutions
("SIFIs") during the 2008-2009 financial crisis may underscore
possible shortcomings in corporate governance. The regulatory
evaluation of contingent capital in the United States could be an
opportunity to assess the possible application of contingent capital
in the corporate governance of SiFIs. While regulatory initiatives
in Europe and the academic debate in the United States are domi-
nated by efforts to improve the technical design features of contin-
gent capital securities, this Article suggests that contingent capital
designs in various jurisdictions could benefit from experimentation
and a learning experience that takes corporate governance applica-
tions into account. As the design features evolve and their scope
and impact become clearer, possible corporate governance improve-
ments could become more obvious.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The events that unfolded during the credit crisis of
2008-2009 lead many observers to conclude that the level of risk
in the financial sector was excessive.' Much of the alleged mar-
ket failure was blamed on risky banking practices.' Systemically
important financial institutions ("SIFIs") and their business prac-
tices played a central role in the events leading up to and during
the financial crisis. The systemic relevance of these institutions
caused many governments to provide bailout funding to avoid
1. See Christian Kirchner, Wege aus der Krise der Euro-Peripherieldnder [Ways
Out of the Crisis of the Euro-Peripheral Countries], BoRSEN-ZFITUNG (Mar. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.boersen-zeitung.de/index.php?li=1&artid=2011046062
&titel =Wege-aus-der-Krise-der-Euro-Peripherielaender; Christian Kirchner,
Comment on Sovereign Bankruptcy in the EU in the Comparative Perspective, OKO-
NOMISCHF ANALYSE DES EUROPARECHTS [ECONOmic ANALYSIS OF EURowFAN LAW]
(Peter Behrens et al. eds., 2011) (written in response to Leszek Balcerowicz's
article Sovereign Bankruptcy in the EU in the Comparative Perspective). For a general
analysis of causal factors of the international financial markets crisis, see Chris-
tian Kirchner, Wege aus der Internationalen Finanzmarktkrise [Ways Out of the Inter-
national Financial Crisis], 89 WIRTSCHAF-TSDIFNST 459, 459-65 (2009); Kenneth
W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and Compara-
tive Perspectives, 10 CI. J. INT'L L. 581, 607-08 (2010); see alsoJames E. Kelly,
Transparency and Bank Supervision, 73 At n. L. Rv. 421, 423-24 (2010) (recogniz-
ing that in light of the recent crisis, critics' concerns have focused on the role of
systemic risk in financial institutions and markets).
2. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. Ri.v.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.coin/abstract=1884437 (arguing
for more transparency via disclosure in the banking sector); Dirk Heremans &
Alessio M. Pacces, Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets, in ENCYcLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND EcoNomics: REcUIATION AND EcoNoMIcs (A.M. Pacces & R.J. Van
den Bergh eds., 2d ed.) (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1914461. The author recognizes that the concepts of "market failure"
and "excessive risk" are controversial. Whether and why markets fail is unclear.
It is also unclear how excessive risk can be defined. Depending on the interpre-
tation of these open questions, policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic may
approach regulation of risk in the banking sector differently.
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larger ripple effects.3 Without bailout funding, bank runs and
panic in financial markets could have become a reality.'
The social costs of government bailouts may be significant.
Government bailouts create strong incentives to externalize the
cost of SIFIs' risk taking onto taxpayers. Bailouts also may distort
markets if some but not all SIFIs receive bailout funds because
the subsidized firm may be able to undercut their competitors.
Increased competition could drive some SIFIs out of business or
into riskier market segments.' The implicit guarantees in a
bailout may also multiply the incentives for SIFIs to increase lev-
erage because the guarantees could make debt cheaper than
equity. Increased leverage of SIFIs has the potential to increase
the overall supply of money and could increase asset price distor-
tions while hiding the mispricing of risk.7 Government bailouts
also raise important ethical issues.' Given the systemic implica-
3. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J.
CORP. L. 469, 470 (2010) (noting that although it would be difficult to extract a
consistent policy from the government's response to failing banks, a "guiding
principle" became a preference for bailouts over bankruptcy and its attendant
consequences); id. ("Lehman proved that you cannot let a large internationally
active firm fail in the middle of a financial crisis.") (quoting Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke); George A. Walker, Financial Cisis-U.K. Policy and
Regulatory Response, 44 INT'L LAw. 751, 753-54 (2010) (commenting that in the
United Kingdom, the bailouts began with the Bank of England eventually
nationalizing Northern Rock Bank in 2008, followed the next year by the gov-
ernment announcing a second support package for struggling banks); see also
BANK OF ENGLAND, FINANCIAL STABIVrIY REPORT (2009) [hereinafter BANK OF
ENGLAND REPORT]. See Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on
an Evolving Standard: Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany
and the United States, 40 SETON HALL. L. REV. 1433, 1435-36 (2010), for a discus-
sion on how several German banks became involved in Asset Backed Commer-
cial Paper (ABCP) Programs. Deutsche Bank, IKB, and SachsenLB "were the
leading bank sponsors with outstanding ABCP." This resulted in the eventual
German government bailout of IKB, as well as WestLB, which had to be bailed
out four times. Id.
4. See Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market's Payment Piorities as Financial
Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REv. 539, 564 (2011) ("[O]ne financial failure
could induce another and, like dominoes, the financial system could
collapse.").
5. See Erik F. Gerding, Deregulation Pas De Deux: Dual Regulatory Classes of
Financial Institutions and the Path to Financial Crisis in Sweden and the United States
8-9 (Univ. N.M. Sch. L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 2010-04,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548753.
6. Id.
7. See Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles and the Dis-
tribution of Income, 30 RiEv. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 230-32 (2011).
8. See RICHARD W. PAINTER, GEirING THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA DESERVES:
How ETHICS REFORM CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE 164-166 (2009); Richard W.
Painter, Bailouts: An Essay on Conflicts of Interest and Ethics When Government Pays
the Tab, 41 McGEORGE L. REV. 131, 159-160 (2010) (arguing that aligning the
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tions of SIFIs, governments may prioritize SIFI bailouts over
other entities. Government prioritization of SIFI bailouts could
incentivize SIFIs to adopt similar risk profiles and correlate risks.9
Cheaper debt as a result of government guarantees also has the
potential to increase regulatory capital arbitrage."'
Given the negative effects of government bailouts and the
extra attention SIFIs may receive from governments, perhaps
existing corporate governance mechanisms are not adequately
addressing SIFI governance concerns. The most high profile
cases of SIFI mismanagement, such as Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers, American Insurance Group ("AIG"), and Merrill
Lynch, could call into question the existing corporate govern-
ance rules pertaining to SIFIs and their management. The con-
duct of management in these cases may have fostered market
activities and investments that turned out to be detrimental to
the value of the shareholders' investment and the stability of the
world financial system. While the conduct of SIFI management
in these cases may not be outright illegal, it seems to call into
question the priorities and moral reasoning of SIFI management.
The issuance of contingent capital securities ("CCS") could
be a promising regulatory tool to address corporate governance
shortcomings in SIFIs. Contingent capital" is an automatic
mechanism for increasing capital while reducing debt with the
incentives of economic actors with the consequences of their actions is one of
the important challenges in creating an economic system that does not need
bailouts).
9. See Viral V. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential
Bank Regulation, 5J. FIN. STAilIlrrY 224 (2009).
10. See Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Ci-
sis, 21 CRITICAL REv. 195 (2009); David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel
Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues, 24J. BANKING & FIN.
35 (2000).
11. For purposes of this Article, the term "contingent capital" or "contin-
gent capital securities" ("CCS") will be used. There are other names for the
same concept. See SQUAM LAKE WORKING GRouP ON FINANCIAL RE;uIAnION, AN
ExPoITED REsOLuTioN MECHANISM FOR DISTREssED FINANCIAL FIRMS: REGculA-
TORY HYnRID SECURITIS 2 (2009) [hereinafter SQUAM LAKE WORKING GRow),
available at http://www.cfr.org/economics/expedited-resolution-mechanism-
distressed-financial-fi rms-regulatory-hybrid-securities/pl 9002 (referring to "reg-
ulatory hybrid securities"); CoCo Nuts: Lloyds is First Out of the Gate with a New
Kind of Capital, ECoNOMisT, Nov. 5, 2009, available at http://www.economist.
com/node/14816673?story-id=14816673 (referring to "contingent con-
vertibles" or "CoCos"); MarkJ. Flannery, Stabilizing Large Financial Institutions
with Contingent Capital Certificates (October 6, 2009) (unpublished com-
ment) (on file with University of Florida, Department of Finance, Insurance
and Real Estate) (referring to "contingent capital certificates"); Julie Dickson,
Remarks at Financial Services Invitational Forum: Too-big-to-fail and Embed-
ded Contingent Capital 4 (May 6, 2010), http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/app/
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long-term benefit of lowering leverage.' 2 By internalizing bank
failure costs, contingent capital could help minimize moral haz-
ard," help avoid financial contagion,' 4 and limit systemic risk.'"
The conversion feature of contingent capital shows great prom-
ise to provide an institution-specific mechanism for general risk
control" and could enhance regulatory capital requirements by
DocRepository/1/eng/speeches/jdlh20100506_e.pdf (referring to "embedded
contingent capital").
12. John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital
and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 CoL.uM. L. REv. 795, 806
(2011) (promoting contingent capital as an alternative to bankruptcy or
bailouts). Coffee suggests a contingent capital design where "(1) The conver-
sion ratio would be deliberately designed to protect the debt holders from loss
by instead diluting the existing equity holders, and (2) the debt security would
convert into a fixed return preferred stock with cumulative arrearages and sig-
nificant voting rights." Coffee avers that converting the debt security into pre-
ferred stock creates a "countervailing voting constituency to offset the voting
power of risk-tolerant common shareholders, thereby reducing the pressure on
corporate managers to accept greater risk and leverage." Under Coffee's pro-
posal, conversion would be triggered when the common stock price signifi-
cantly decreases. Id.
13. See Mark J. Flannery, No Pain, No Gain? Effecting Market Discipline
via "Reverse Convertible Debentures," 15 (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manu-
script) (Program on International Financial Systems at Harv. L. Sch.) ("Fre-
quent trigger evaluations eliminate moral hazard incentives and expose the
RCD to surprisingly low default risk."), available at http://bear.warrington.ufl.
edu/flannery/No%20Pain,%2ONo%2OGain.pdf.
14. GOLDMAN SACHS GI.OlAL MARKET INST., EFFECTIVE REGULATION: PART
5: ENDING "Too BIG TO FAIL" (2009) [hereinafter GOLDMAN SACHS, EFFECTIVE
REGULATION], h1ttp://www2.goldmansachs.coin/our-thinking/public-policy/
regulatory-reform/effect-reform-part-5.pdf (showing what could have hap-
pened if contingent capital had been in place during the recent economic cri-
sis.). The authors also note that if the appropriate triggers are in place, it could
prevent bank runs; though if the trigger is based on market prices, it could
worsen bank runs. Id. at 5-6.
15. Coffee, supra note 12, at 806 (suggesting that contingent capital
should be designed to create a standard for SIFIs).
16. Raghuram G. Rajan, Too Systemic to Fail: Consequences, Causes, and
Potential Remedies 25, 28 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Papers No. 305,
2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work305.pdf ("[C]ontingent capi-
tal is like installing sprinklers . . . . [Wihen fire threatens, the sprinklers will
turn on."). But see Christian Koziol &Jochen Lawrenz, Contingent Convertibles:
Solving or Seeding the Next Banking Crisis?, 36J. BANKING & FIN. 90, 91 (2012) for a
suggestion that CoCo bonds may "create negative externalities . . . in the sense
that" the destabilizing risk-shifting problem induced by CoCo bonds may
overcompensate the stabilizing effect of providing a pre-committed recapitaliza-
tion to banks. Id. Through the use of a "dynamic continuous-time framework"
the authors conclude that "the beneficial impact of CoCo bonds crucially
hinges on the assumption if bank managers have substantial discretion over the
bank's business risk." Id. at 101. The authors contend that if complete con-
tracts can be written, CoCos are clearly beneficial. If allowing for incomplete
contracts, however, the authors argue that "CoCo bonds always distort risk tak-
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creating a regime for providing countercyclical regulatory
capital.'"
The design features of contingent capital securities are not
fully developed.'" The evolving design of contingent capital
securities in various jurisdictions could have an effect on the nas-
cent market in contingent capital securities, other financial mar-
kets, future bailouts, moral hazard, risk taking by managers, and
the perception of systemic risk and operational risk in SIFIs. Pos-
sible contingent capital rules should attempt to balance these
interests.
In the United States, section 165(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act
authorizes the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to util-
ize contingent capital."' Section 115(c) of the Dodd-Frank Act
requires a study on the feasibility of contingent capital in the
United States."' The language of section 115(c) does not
ing incentives. Therefore, equity holders have incentives to take excessive
risks . . . . Thus, CoCos may be an example where individually rational deci-
sions can have systemically undesirable outcomes." Id.
17. See William C. Dudley, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve N.Y., Some Les-
sons from the Crisis, Remarks at the Institute of International Bankers Member-
ship Luncheon (Oct. 13, 2009), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/speeches/2009/dud091013.ltmi (proposing that CCS can be used
to adequately capture risk).
18. See id.; Christoph Henkel & Wulf A. Kaal, Sequential Contingent Capital
Triggers in Europe and the United States, 49 SAN DIco L. Riv. (forthcoming 2012)
(recognizing that contingent capital designs are not fully developed and sug-
gesting a modification to Coffee's approach by separating the trigger events for
a voting rights increase after conversion).
19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 165(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1404, 1423
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (Supp. IV 2011)).
20. Id. § 115(c) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5325):
CONTINGENT CAPITAL.- (1) STUDY REQUIRED.-The Council
shall conduct a study of the feasibility, benefits, costs, and structure of
a contingent capital requirement for non-bank financial companies
supervised by the Board of Governors and bank holding companies
described in subsection (a), which study shall include-
(A) an evaluation of the degree to which such requirement would
enhance the safety and soundness of companies subject to the require-
ment, promote the financial stability of the United States, and reduce
risks to United States taxpayers;
(B) an evaluation of the characteristics and amounts of contingent
capital that should be required;
(C) an analysis of potential prudential standards that should be used
to determine whether the contingent capital of a company would be
converted to equity in times of financial stress;
(D) an evaluation of the costs to companies, the effects on the struc-
ture and operation of credit and other financial markets, and other
economic effects of requiring contingent capital;
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directly address the possible application of contingent capital in
a corporate governance context. In subsection (A), the Act pro-
vides for "an evaluation of the degree to which such [a contin-
gent capital] requirement would enhance the safety and
soundness of companies subject to the requirement, promote the
financial stability of the United States, and reduce risks to United
States taxpayers."2 The evaluation of "safety and soundness of
companies subject to the requirement"2 2 could include an assess-
ment of the possible application of contingent capital in corpo-
rate governance.
Regulatory initiatives in Europe and the academic debate in
the United States focus on improving the technical design fea-
tures of contingent capital securities. Given the importance of
technical design features, possible applications of CCS for corpo-
rate governance are mostly ignored. In fact, it is tempting to
ignore broader implications and possible applications of contin-
gent capital and focus exclusively on technical design features
and the economics of a design, or launch directly into a critique
or evaluation of broader implications and possible applications
without a full evaluation of technical design aspects. Either
approach seems suboptimal.
As contingent capital design features evolve and their scope
and impact become clearer, so may their shortcomings, ethical
implications, and possible corporate governance applications.
The efficient functioning of contingent capital designs could
benefit from experimentation and a learning experience that
takes corporate governance considerations into account.2 3 Con-
tingent capital could have the potential to change the control
dynamic, the power structure, and dependencies within SIFIs.
Shareholders, management, and creditors could be equally
affected. Combined with other corporate governance mecha-
nisms, CCSs, as an internal institution-specific mechanism, could
help fill a void left by regulators' seeming inability to supervise
financial institutions effectively.
(E) an evaluation of the effects of such requirement on the interna-
tional competitiveness of companies subject to the requirement and
the prospects for international coordination in establishing such
requirement; and
(F) recommendations for implementing regulations.
Id.
21. Id. § 115(c)(1)(A).
22. Id.
23. See infra Part VI (describing the New Institutional Approach to experi-
mentation and a learning experience).
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This Article starts with a summary of mismanagement in
SIFIs, management practices, and possible corporate governance
shortcomings pertaining to SIFIs. Next, it discusses briefly the
benefits and potential shortcomings of proposed contingent cap-
ital designs. The Article then explores the current proposals for
contingent capital designs, underscoring the need for experi-
mentation, before sketching the possible application of contin-
gent capital in corporate governance.
The preliminary inquiry in this Article suggests that, as the
design features of contingent capital in different jurisdictions
evolve, more research on the possible application of contingent
capital in corporate governance could be needed.
II. GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES FOR SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Systemically important financial institutions ("SIFIs") played
a central role in the events leading to the 2008-2009 financial
crisis. Without bailout funding for SIFIs, bank runs2 4 and panic
in financial markets could have become a reality.2 1
SIFI executives have promoted market activities and invest-
ments that turned out to be detrimental to the value of the share-
holders' investment and the stability of the world financial
system. While the questionable conduct of SIFI management
may not be outright illegal, it could call into question the priori-
ties and moral reasoning of SIFI management. It is noteworthy
that in the time period leading up to the credit crisis most of the
SIFIs operating in world markets engaged in highly leveraged
trading of high-risk financial instruments without appropriate
risk parameters in place. If SIFI leaders act on an informed basis,
as required by the U.S. business judgment rule, they should
arguably at least know about the risks the company takes and
monitor those risks.2" Alas, this was not always the case, as the
short summary of high profile SIFI failures below shows.
In In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, a Dela-
ware Chancery Court opinion that provided the first detailed
analysis of potential liability of directors for losses incurred as a
24. See Walker, supra note 3, at 753-54. Though Northern Rock did not
have significant exposure to the U.S. subprime market, it was dependent on
wholesale funding from inter-bank markets within the U.K. Northern Rock's
funding diminished with the reduction of wholesale lending. The lack of fund-
ing was leaked to the public through a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
report, thus precipitating the bank run. Id.
25. See id.; Roe, supra note 4.
26. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 3, at 1459-74 (evaluating the policy
responses in Germany and the United States).
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result of substantial exposure to subprime debt, shareholder
plaintiffs alleged (1) breach of fiduciary duties for failing to
properly monitor and manage the risk that Citigroup faced con-
cerning problems in the subprime lending market, and (2) fail-
ure to properly disclose the company's exposure regarding
subprime assets. 27 According to the complaint, starting in May
2005, "red flags" should have immediately alerted the defendants
to problems in the real estate and credit markets.28 By ignoring
these warning signs, Citigroup managers allegedly overempha-
sized short-term profits and sacrificed the long-term viability of
Citigroup." In contrast to European developments in the con-
text of manager risk taking during the crisis,3 0 the Delaware
Chancery court held that management's inability to predict the
future and an incorrect evaluation of business risk were not viola-
tions of directors' oversight responsibilities.3' Risk is inherent in
maximizing shareholder value, and losses in and of themselves
do not suffice to hold directors personally liable for taking risks
that lead to losses.32
In 2007, Bear Stearns's head hedge-fund trader, Ralph
Cioffi, created a group of funds, the Klios funds, that sold short-
term debt instruments and used the proceeds to purchase collat-
eralized debt obligations ("CDOs") backed by mortgages.33 The
short-term debt offered by the Bear Stearns fund offered higher
yields than other short-term investments and came with a guaran-
tee from other institutions. These features attracted significant
investor interest. 34 Cioffi and Bear Stearns continued this sales
strategy even after the subprime mortgage market began to fal-
ter.3 5 Management seemed disengaged." Most notably, while
the Klios fund was collapsing, Bear Stearns's CEO at the time,
James Cayne, was reported to have attended a ten-day bridge
27. 964 A.2d 106, 114 (Del. Ch. 2009).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 123. According to the Delaware Chancery court, however, over-
sight liability can only be established if the plaintiff can show that either "the
directors knew they were not discharging their fiduciary [duties] or that the
directors demonstrated a conscious disregard for their responsibilities . Id.
(emphasis in original).
30. Kaal & Painter, supra note 3, at 1473-74.
31. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 131.
32. Id.
33. See David Henry & Matthew Goldstein, The Bear Flu: How it Spread,




36. Kate Kelly, Bear CEO's Handling of Crisis Raises Issues: Cayne on Golf
Links, 10-Day Bridge Trip Amid Summer Turmoil, WALL ST.J., Nov. 1, 2007, at Al.
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tournament in Tennessee, without a cellular phone or email. 7
While most SIFIs at the time engaged in some variation of this
behavior, the Bear Stearns's Klios fund group bought the CDOs
almost exclusively from the hedge-funds that Cioffi himself man-
aged. This substantially inflated the returns of these funds and
resulted in a Department of Justice inquiry." Mr. Cioffi had
moved $2 million of his own money out of one of the Klios funds
shortly before it collapsed." Cioffi and his co-manager Matthew
Tannin were indicted for securities fraud but were found not-
guilty on all counts.4 0 In part, the pursuit of profits may have
induced CEO Cayne to support the highly leveraged fixed-
income part of the business.4' A lack of capital in combination
with the highly leveraged fixed-income business eventually led to
a liquidity crisis that precipitated the sale of the company. 2
Similarly, American International Group ("AIG") profited
from insuring mortgage-backed securities, triple-A rated securi-
ties, and CDOs backed by subprime mortgages." The culture at
AIG is said to have discouraged dissent and allowed increased
risk.44 Under the leadership of Joe Cassano, who is accused of
having lacked a full appreciation of the risks AIG was taking,
AIG's financial products division eventually secured $1 trillion in
CDOs. As AIG's activity in this market increased, the amount of
subprime loans backing CDOs increased from 2% to 95%. Nev-
ertheless, AIG continued securing billions in CDOs based upon
the assumption that the real estate market would maintain its
value. When the real estate market crashed in 2007, the owners
of those securities demanded payment. AIG could not deliver on
its promises and had to be bailed out by the U.S. government.
During Stanley O'Neal's tenure as CEO at Merrill Lynch, the
company's exposure to CDOs increased from $1 billion to $40
billion in eighteen months."5 After acquiring a subprime lender
in the first quarter of 2007, Merrill Lynch was the largest under-
37. Id.
38. Henry & Goldstein, supra note 33.
39. Id.
40. William D. Cohan, Op-Ed., How the Scapegoats Escaped, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 12, 2009, at A35.
41. William D. Cohan, Op-Ed., A Tsunami of Excuses, N.Y. TIrvM-s, Mar. 12,
2009, at A29.
42. Id.
43. See Michael Lewis, The Man Who Crashed the World, VANITY FAIR, Aug.
2009, at 98.
44. Id.
45. See Landon Thomas Jr. & Jenny Anderson, A Risk-Taker's Reign at Mer-
rill Ends With a Swift, Messy Fall, N.Y. Timns, Oct. 29, 2007, at Al.
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writer of CDOs before the crisis." Despite its significant expo-
sure to this market segment, Merrill executives reassured the
market that their business was not negatively impacted by sub-
prime lending problems.4 7 By October of 2007, Merrill's losses
were estimated at around $4 billion." The executives in charge
of the fixed-income income division were fired." Merrill's board
of directors had given O'Neal a $46 million bonus for his per-
formance in 2006 but dismissed him after the CDO related losses
were reported. 0 By the end of October 2007, Merrill Lynch had
written off $8 billion in CDOs." The write-off precipitated rating
companies, such as Moody's and Fitch, to downgrade the securi-
ties.52 After declaring that the company's problems had been
addressed, Merrill Lynch reported $10 billion in write-offs in the
fourth quarter of 2007," $9 billion in the first quarter of 2008,"
and an additional $10 billion in the second quarter of 2008."
Despite raising $15 billion in additional capital, Merrill Lynch
was forced to agree to a sale to Bank of America in September of
2008 for $50.3 billion.
The demise of Lehman Brothers was less transparent and
happened more quickly. Even in July of 2007, Lehman contin-
ued to deny any subprime lending problems.57 In the third quar-
ter of 2007 the company reported a 3.2% decrease in income
46. See Randall Smith & Serena Ng, Merrill Hints of Credit Woes; Filing Comes
as Rivals Prepare to Post Results, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2007, at B5.
47. This assertion led some analysts to question Merrill Lynch's account-
ing practices. See id.
48. See Landon Thomas Jr., 2 Executives Are Ousted At Merrill, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 2007, at Cl.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Aparajita Saha-Bubna & Carrick Mollenkamp, CDO Ratings Are
Whacked By Moody's; AAA to junk in a Day Raises More Questions About Credit Agen-
cies, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2007, at BI.
52. Id.
53. SeeJenny Anderson, Merrill Posts Huge Loss; Chief Says Firm's Capital is
Adequate, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 18, 2008, at C6.
54. See Louise Story, At Merrill, Wite-Downs and More Layoffs, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 18, 2008, at C6 (reporting a write-down of $9.7 billion).
55. Susanne Craig & Randall Smith, Merrill Posts Another Loss; Write-Downs
Keep Coming, WAiL ST. J., July 18, 2008, at C1.
56. See Louise Story, Merrill Sale to Bank ofAmerica Is End of an Era Brokerage
Firm Founded in 1914, Was First to Bring Wall Street to Main Street, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 16, 2008, at 13.
57. See Christopher Faille, Lehman Fills Risk Post, Denies Subprime Rumors,
HEDGEWORLD NEWS (July 18, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 13714696.
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from the previous quarter," followed by a 12% decrease in the
fourth quarter."' Until October of 2007, however, Lehman had
not written off any CDOs." The CEO, Richard S. Fuld Jr.,
received a pay package of $22 million for 2007."' Lehman
declared losses starting in the first quarter of 2008 until the firm,
under the weight of $60 billion in bad real estate investments,
declared bankruptcy in mid-September 2008." In May of 2008,
analysts had expressed concerns about Lehman's accounting
methods. CEO Fuld, however, continued to assert that the com-
pany was on solid footing and would emerge independently from
the crisis."3 By the time Fuld realized that he had to find a buyer
for Lehman, it was too late to sell for most stockholders."4 In
light of accusations about the use of questionable accounting
practices to hide the level of risk at Lehman, the New York State
Attorney General considered charging Lehman executives with
violating securities laws." Proving those charges, however, could
have been extremely difficult and the State Attorney General
eventually declined to press charges."
JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs emerged relatively
unscathed from the crisis. However, both firms had to pay SEC
fines of $153 million 7 and $550 million," respectively, to settle
charges of misleading investors about the values of CDOs.
The anecdotal evidence pertaining to ethically questionable
conduct of SIFI leaders is certainly not dispositive or indicative of
underlying trends. It does seem to show, however, that some of
58. See Jenny Anderson, Lehman Profit is Stronger than Expected; Wall St.
Relieved, N.Y. TIMis, Sept. 19, 2007, at C3 (reporting that "[t]hird quarter profit
fell 3 percent").
59. See jenny Anderson, Lehman's Earnings Fall 12% in a Season that Could
Have Been Worse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at CIO.
60. See Jenny Anderson, The Survivor: Lehman Brothers Speaks Loudly and
Avoids Big Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2007, at BI.
61. Dan Wilchins, Lehman's Fuld Gets $22 mln in Fiscal '07, RFUTmRS (Mar.
5, 2008, 6:16 PM), http://www.reuters.coi/article/2008/03/05/lehman-fild-
i(USN0565219320080305.
62. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Merrill is Sold; Failing to Find Buyer, Lehman Set
to File for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at Al.
63. SeeJenny Anderson, et al., As Options Fade, Lehman Is Said To Seek a
Buyer, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 2008, at Al.
64. Id., at A16.
65. See Steve Eder, Lehman Auditor May Bear The Brunt, WALL ST. J., Mar.
14, 2011, at Cl.
66. Id., at C3.
67. See Dominic Rushe, JP Morgan Pays SEC $153M to Settle Charges Over
Mortgage Securities, GUARDIAN, June 21, 2011, at 24.
68. See Goldman's Record Payout Over Subprime: A Price Worth Paying, EcONO-
MIST ONLINE (July 15, 2010), http://www.econoinist.com/blogs/newsbook/
2010/07/goldmans..record-payout-oversbI)primfle.
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the most pervasive cases of unethical conduct did involve SIFIs.
Legislatures worldwide recognize that avoiding a repeat of the
financial crisis of 2008-2009 is an important legislative objec-
tive." The regulation of financial institutions has emerged as a
priority.'o However, the proposals have not yet focused on mech-
anisms that specifically address the corporate governance short-
comings pertaining to SIFIs. The mismanagement of SIFIs,
management practices, and possible corporate governance short-
comings pertaining to SIFIs could call for an internal SIFI-spe-
cific mechanism that addresses corporate governance
shortcomings in SIFIs without imposing undue regulatory bur-
dens on these entities.
III. CONTINGENT CAPITAL
The concept of contingent capital securities has been recog-
nized as a promising tool to address core issues in the context of
regulating SIFIs." For purposes of this Article, contingent capi-
tal is the predefined conversion of a certain percentage of finan-
cial institutions' debt securities into equity securities. Contingent
capital is an automatic mechanism for increasing capital while
reducing debt with the long-term benefit of lowering leverage.
Strained financial institutions may find the automatic conversion
of debt into equity an attractive alternative to being forced into
restructuring or liquidation.7 3
69. The Dodd-Frank Act was enacted with the intention of preventing
another crisis. See 155 CONG. REc. H14418, H14420 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2009)
(statement of Rep. Kanjorski) ("[T]his body will have the opportunity to . . .
fundamentally change the way Wall Street and large financial institutions oper-
ate. For roughly two years, we have endured a severe crisis that exposed vulnera-
bilities in our system for overseeing the financial sector and demonstrated the
perils of deregulation."); HM TREASURY, A NEw APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGU-
LATION: JUDGMENT, FocUS, AN1D STAILIrrY 62 (2010) ("The policy objective is to
reform the regulatory system for financial services to avoid a repeat of the finan-
cial crisis.").
70. For example, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 808, 124 Stat. 1376, 1816
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5467 (Supp. IV 2011)), which is entitled
"Examination of and Enforcement Actions Against Financial Institutions Sub-
ject to Standards for Designated Activities," and provides that the relevant
agency prescribe risk management standards.
71. See infra Part III.A.
72. Coffee, supra note 12, at 805 (averring that contingent capital can
counter leverage debt). For a reading that is critical in the context of automa-
tion of financial regulation, see generally AMAR BHIDE, A CALL FOR JUDGMENT:
SENSIBLE FINANCE FOR A DYNAMIC ECONOMY (2010).
73. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 18; Coffee, supra note 12, at 805.
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Because contingent capital shows great promise for internal-
izing bank failure cost," stabilizing SIFIs, and preparing SIFIs for
future financial crises,75 policy makers7" and academics7 7 support
74. See id.; Flannery, supra note 11, at 12; Robert L. McDonald, Contin-
gent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger 1, 20 (Apr. 11, 2011) (unpublished man-
uscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553430. McDonald proposes a
model for contingent capital where debt converts to equity if both (1) "the
firm's stock price is at or below a trigger value," and (2) "the value of a financial
institution's index is also at or below a trigger value." Id. at 1. McDonald con-
cludes that the dual trigger proposal's strength is its reliance on market prices,
and its disadvantage is the index trigger, which could potentially create "a situa-
tion where it might be profitable to manipulate the index or try to force bank-
ruptcy." Id. at 12-13; see also Darrell Duffie, Contractual Methods for Out-Of-
Court Restructuring of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (Prelimi-
nary Draft 2009), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/doci
ments/06EndingGovernmentBailoutsAsWeKnowThemDuffie.pdf (focusing on
possible triggers of Distress-Contingent Convertible Bonds/Debt (essentially
CCS)). Duffie explains that if the trigger is an accounting capital ratio, it may
not be able to capture the true financial condition of the bank because of
accounting failures. Id. at 4. The ratio of tangible common equity (TCE) to
tangible assets may be more effective because it excludes the relatively "useless
assets during a solvency crisis." Id. If the trigger is determined by market value,
the impact of a short seller speculative attack could be mitigated by using a
trailing average share price e.g. the preceding 20 days. Id. at 4-5. To eliminate
a bank run, the trigger should be set to convert debt into equity before a liquid-
ity crisis begins. Id. at 5. Duffie also discusses mandatory rights offerings. Id. at
6-10.
75. See Flannery, supra note 11, at 2.
76. See Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke, in a Bow to Critics of Fed's Role, Sup-
ports Forming a Regulatory Group, N.Y. Timis, Oct. 2, 2009, at B3 (stating that
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, opined that giant financial
players might be forced to adopt "contingent" capital, and noting that the con-
tingent capital is "gaining popularity within the Fed."); Daniel K. Tarullo, Fed-
eral Reserve Governor, Speech at the Exchequer Club in Washington, D.C. to
the Federal Reserve: Confronting Too Big to Fail (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo2009lO21a.htm (commenting
that contingent capital is an effort "worth pursuing"). For a description of the
policy in the European Union, see Press Release, European Comm'n, Commis-
sion Wants Stronger and More Responsible Banks in Europe (July 20, 2011),
http://eiropa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/I1/915&for
mat=HTML&aged=0&langtage=en&guiLangtiage=en ("The proposal will
require banks to hold more and better capital to resist future shocks by them-
selves . . . . With its proposal, the Commission translates in Europe interna-
tional standards on bank capital agreed at the G20 level (most commonly
known as the Basel III agreement)."). See also COMM'N OF EXPERTS, FINAL
REtroRT OF THE COMMissioN OF ExPERTS FOR LINTING THE ECONOMIC RIsKs
Posm iiv LARGE COMPANIEs 59-60 (Sept. 2010) [hereinafter Swiss REPORT],
available at http://www.sif.admin.ch/dokumentation/00514/00519/00592/
index.html?lang=en (proposing the conversion of contingent capital upon cer-
tain triggering events).
77. See, e.g., Christoph K. Henkel & Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in
European Bank Restructuring, 81 Nw. J. INT'l. L. & Bus. (forthcoming 2012); see
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the concept and have identified several core objectives for using
contingent capital securities, including but not limited to: (1) sig-
nalling default risk," (2) providing incentive to increase capi-
tal," (3) preventing bailouts," (4) decreasing risk taking, (5)
DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DoDD-FRANK Acr
AND ITS (Unintended) Consequences 84-85 (2011) (arguing that the then-
existing channels of bankruptcy would have sufficed to treat failing banks and
noting that the Dodd-Frank Act instructs the General Accountability Office to
conduct a study on contingent capital and to begin using it when the study is
completed). While Skeel refers to contingent capital as a "promising strategy,"
he points out some limitations. Contingent capital will not be "especially effec-
tive if the bank can easily manipulate its capital, or if capital requirements are
low." Id. at 84-85. Skeel also recognizes that "contingent capital will not pro-
tect against a sudden collapse, as in the cases of Bear Stearns and AIG-a col-
lapse that occurs so quickly and so pervasively that new capital would come too
late to break the fall." Id. at 85; see also Coffee, supra note 12, at 801-03 (promot-
ing contingent capital as an alternative to bailouts); Henkel & Kaal, supra note
18; George Pennacchi et al., Contingent Capital: The Case for COERCs 9, 13
(INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2010/89/FIN, 2010), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1656994. Pennacchi proposes a
Call Option Enhanced Reversed Convertible (COERC) security as a form of
contingent capital. A COERC has two significant features: (1) "the conversion
price is set significantly below the trigger price," and (2) shareholders have the
option to "buy the shares back from the bondholders after conversion at this
same low conversion price." Id. at 9. Pennacchi notes that for conversion to
occur at such low stock prices, common stockholders would have to approve the
increase in authorized shares. The authors assert that the structure of COERCs
would potentially make future financial distress less likely, stating that "the fact
that the conversion price is set significantly below the trigger price gives a
strong incentive for shareholders to . .. repay the bonds at their par value. This
will in turn reduce the risk of the bonds, thereby enhancing their marketability
with fixed income investors." Id. The authors also note that contingent capital
can prevent bail-outs of banks that are "too big to fail." Id. at 1.
78. See Raghuram Rajan, More Capital Will Not Stop the Next Crisis, FIN.
TIMES (London) (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a830fcf6-
aedl-1lde-96d7-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlaQNhCNnY (suggesting that CCS
should be used to raise capital "when regulators see a crisis coming"); Dudley,
supra note 17 (proposing that CCS can be used to adequately capture risk).
79. See SQUAM LAKE WORKING GROUP, supra note 11 (suggesting that
hybrid securities would increase creditors' confidence in banks, prevent
bailouts, and enable banks to raise more private capital). Squam Lake's sug-
gested trigger mechanism would be dual: (1) "a declaration by regulators that
the financial system is suffering from a systemic crisis," and (2) "a violation by
the bank of covenants in the hybrid-security contract." Id. at 4. The bank-spe-
cific trigger would likely "be based on the measures used to determine a bank's
capital adequacy, such as the ratio of Tier I capital to risk-adjusted assets." Id.
Squam Lake also offers alternatives for the rate at which debt will convert to
equity, including basing the conversion rate solely on market value of equity or
on the market value of equity and the hybrid security. Id.; see also Charles W.
Calomiris & RichardJ. Herring, Why and How to Design a Contingent Convert-
ible Debt Requirement 39 (Apr. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
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minimizing moral hazard," (6) avoiding financial contagion,
and (7) limiting systemic risk." While legislatures in some juris-
dictions have set up contingent capital rules," the role of contin-
gent capital in international finance and its potential
applications remain unclear."
A. Possible Applicalions
Contingent capital securities have the potential to play a sig-
nificant role in the efficient restructuring and resolution of fail-
ing financial institutions. 7 Contingent capital could also
support and optimize general risk control in financial institu-
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815406 (also proposing that a contingent capital
requirement would be an incentive to capitalize).
80. See SQUAN LAKE WORKING GRouP, supra note 11, at 4 (suggesting that
hybrid securities would help prevent bailouts); Coffee, supra note 12, at 801-03
(promoting contingent capital as an alternative to bailouts); Calomiris & Her-
ring, supra note 79, at 39 (averring that contingent capital could help prevent
the "too big to fail" problem).
81. See Pennacchi et al., supra note 77, at 9, 13 (suggesting that their
COERC proposal would reduce the risks of bonds); Dudley, supra note 17 (aver-
ring that because bank difficulties would trigger conversion, this dilution of
shareholders creates an incentive for bank managers to "manage not only for
good outcomes on the upside of the boom, but also against bad outcomes on
the downside").
82. See Flannery, supra note 13, at 15.
83. See GOL.DMAN SACHs, EFFECTIv. RicuIATION, supra note 14, at 6 (not-
ing that if the appropriate triggers are in place, it could prevent bank runs-
though if the trigger is based on market prices, it could worsen bank runs).
84. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 18; Coffee, supra note 12, at 806 (sug-
gesting that contingent capital should be designed to create a standard for sys-
temically important financial institutions).
85. See also discussion infra Part III.C (discussing the Swiss, German, and
United Kingdom law).
86. See, e.g., SKEot, supra note 77, at 85 (pointing out that contingent capi-
tal will not likely be effective if a bank can "easily manipulate its capital," and
that contingent capital "will not protect against a sudden collapse, as in the
cases of Bear Stearns and AIG"); Koziol & Lawrenz, supra note 16, at 91, 101; see
also Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial
Institutions 5 (Institutions and Markets Series, 2009), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1533274. In proposing a market-based
trigger, Hart and Zingales point out that Flannery's 2005 proposal has three
potential shortcomings: "First, it is too lenient toward management, eliminating
one of the disciplinary effects of debt. Second, it can have perverse effects: the
manager talking down the stock so as to obtain more slack. Third, it generates
multiple equilibria, some of which are inefficient." Id.
87. Henkel & Kaal, supra note 18; DG Internal Market and Services, Tech-
nical Details of a Possible Framework for Bank Recovery and Resolution, Annex
I (Jan. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter DG Market], available at
http://ec.eiropa.eu/internal market/consutltations/docs/2011/crisis-man
agement/consutltation-paper en.pdf.
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tions." By internalizing bank failure costs, contingent capital
could contribute to minimizing moral hazard. Evaluations of
contingent capital triggers could help eliminate moral hazard
incentives and could further lower default risk of CCS." Install-
ing contingent capital could be more efficient than raising capi-
tal requirements because the capital injection is available only
when it is needed. When triggered, only enough CCS would con-
vert as is necessary to recapitalize the firm.
Contingent capital could also incentivize SIFI management
to lower their risk taking on behalf of the financial institution.9 0
The threat of dilution of stock holdings in combination with a
threat of loss due to conversion could help reduce shareholder
pressure on SIFI management to take higher risks." If conver-
sion should have a negative effect on the stock price, 2 manage-
ment could be further incentivized to maintain and manage risk
to avoid reputational loss and income reduction due to losses in
stock options and other deferred compensation." These and
88. See Rajan, supra note 16, at 28. But see Koziol & Lawrenz, supra note
16, at 91.
89. See Flannery, supra note 13, at 3. Flannery suggests that Reverse Con-
vertible Debentures (RCD) (essentially CCS) could allow for recapitalization
without involving outside parties (e.g., taxpayers). The trigger would be auto-
matic based on market value and convert at the current share price. Id. 'Issu-
ing RCD as part of a bank's capital structure will then a) protect depositors and
taxpayers via a transparent means of automatic re-capitalization, b) cause share-
holders to internalize the costs of risk, c) impose no tax penalty on bank share-
holders, and d) reduce the incidence of costly failures." Id.
90. Coffee, supra note 12, at 806. Coffee avers that converting the debt
security into preferred stock creates a "countervailing voting constituency,"
which offsets the voting power of "risk-tolerant common shareholders, thereby
reducing the pressure on corporate managers to accept greater risk and lever-
age." Id.; see also Dudley, supra note 17 ("If the bank encounters difficulties,
triggering conversion, shareholders would be automatically and immediately
diluted. This would create strong incentives for bank managements to manage
not only for good outcomes on the upside of the boom, but also against bad
outcomes on the downside.").
91. Dudley, supra note 17.
92. A potential effect of CCS conversion on stock prices will likely be eval-
uated in future research. See Suresh Sundaresen & Zhenyu Wang, On the Design
of Contingent Capital with Market Trigger 21 (FRB of New York Staff Report, Work-
ing Paper No. 448, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1612894 (suggesting that under their design of contin-
gent capital, where the state-contingent conversion ratio prevents value trans-
fer, the prices would be kept "'smooth' at conversion").
93. Even though there is a trend toward a reduction in stock option com-
pensation, management may still receive a certain percentage of their compen-
sation in stock options. See Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu,
Economics, Politics, and the International Principles for Sound Compensation Practices:
An Analysis of Executive Pay at European Banks, 64 VAND. L. REV. 431, 460-61
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other observations could contribute to an increasing role of con-
tingent capital in executive compensation.
Contingent capital could also create a regime for providing
countercyclical regulatory capital" that further enhances regula-
tory capital requirements of the Federal Reserve" and under
Basel III."
B. Unresolved Design Issues
If the proliferation of the market in contingent capital secur-
ities should continue, contracting parties and policy makers
could eventually be tasked with resolving open design issues
and potential flaws in the design of contingent capital in their
respective jurisdictions. The optimal design of CCS has been
the subject of a long academic debate."' Unresolved ques-
tions include: design features of CCS and the calibration of
(2011) (noting that stock option compensation has been curtailed). For exam-
pie, in France, remuneration requirements ban stock options and limit
bonuses. See id.
94. See Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation,
(unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with author).
95. See Dudley, supra note 17.
96. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 3 171, 124 Stat. 1376, 1435 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (Supp. IV 201 1));John H. Cochrane, Op-Ed., The
More Bank Capital, the Safer the Bank, WAiL. ST. J., July 15, 2011, at A15 (stating
that "the Federal Reserve wants another 3% for 'systemically important banks,'"
bringing the total regulatory capital requirement to 10% and that the Federal
Reserve's Dan Tarullo even proposed a 14% capital requirement).
97. Press Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Group of Governors and
Heads of Supervision Announces Higher Global Minimum Capital Standards
(Sept. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Press Release, BIS], available at http://www.bis.
org/press/p100912.pdf; see also Rajan, supra note 78 (suggesting that CCS
should be used to raise capital "when regulators see a crisis coming"). Raising
capital through CCS during "good times" will allow it to be cheap and easier to
enforce. Id. Also, infusing capital during "bad times" protects the system and
the taxpayers with the right contingencies in place. Id. CCS has both stick and
carrot incentives. Id. Automatic conversion of CCS has a disciplinary effect by
punishing aggregate bank losses. Id. Conversion when a bank's capital ratio
falls below a certain level encourages banks to anticipate losses to raise new
capital and to protect the taxpayer and their shareholders. Id. But see Coch-
rane, supra note 96, at Al5, for an argument that financial engineers will likely
find a way to circumvent the new rules on regulatory capital under Basel III and
Dodd-Frank, because they did so successfully in the past. As long as the govern-
mnent subsidizes lending and bail-outs, more capital is needed to make banks
safer.
98. See supra notes 11-18; Calomiris & Herring, supra note 79; Duffie,
supra note 74; McDonald, supra note 74; Pennacchi et al., supra note 77.
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design features," the mandatory or voluntary nature of con-
tingent capital,' 00 the objectives of CCS,'0 ' CCS market evolu-
tion, 0 2 and the volume of CCS issuance,' 03 among others.10 4
99. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 827 (noting that many papers focus on
the mechanics of contingent capital); Meera Louis, Europeans Lose Out to U.S.
with Basel Committee's Contingent Capital Vote, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2011, 10:38
AM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-26/basel-committee-decision-
on-contingent-capital-backs-u-s-stance.html (explaining that not all European
countries even support the use of contingent capital). Scholars have suggested
a variety of different design features. See Duffie, supra note 74, at 3 ("There are
a number of alternative designs for the distress trigger and for the conversion
ratio, the number of shares of equity to be received in exchange for each dollar
of bond principal."); Flannery, supra note 11, at 4 (arguing that the conversion
trigger must be expressed in terms of equity's contemporaneous market value);
McDonald, supra note 74, at 1.
100. Compare Coffee, supra note 12, at 808 (discussing ideas for
mandatory implementation of contingent capital which "can work even when
regulatory oversight fails and a crisis sneaks in under the regulators' radar
screen"), with Letter from Mary F. Monroe, Vice President, Office of Regulatory
Policy, Amer. Bankers Assoc., to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 3
(Oct. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Monroe Letter], available at http://www.aba.com/
NR/rdonlyres/DC65CE I 2-B1 C7-1 1D4-AB4A-00508B95258D/69072/ABACom
mentonBCBSContingentCapitalProposal101001.pdf. Unlike Coffee, Monroe
finds that mandatory contingent capital would
hinder unduly the flexibility of banks to create a capital structure that
best meets the needs of the bank and its investors . . . . Other banks
may not be able to, or may find it inefficient to, issue contingent or
convertible instruments for a variety of reasons-including, for
instance, restrictions under their chartering instruments, tax issues
related to the deductibility of payments on the instruments, lack of
market access, or insufficient investor interest. These banks should
not be harmed by a perception that they are not as well capitalized as
others simply because they need to or choose to meet their capital
needs through other acceptable channels.
Id.
101. See SQUAM LAKE WORKING GROUP, supra note 11, at 4 (noting that
contingent capital is intended to increase creditors' confidence in banks, pre-
vent bailouts, and enable banks to raise more capital).
102. See Letter from the European Ass'n of Public Banks (EAPB) to The
European Commission on Internal Market and Services 8-9 (2011) [hereinafter
EAPB, Comments], available at http://www.eapb.eu/file?fle=6701 (pointing out
burdens including higher costs to the banks for senior debt instruments and
the marketability of this type of instrument in regards to the comprehensive
approach); EUROPEAN BANKING FEDERATION (EBF), POSITIONING IN RESPECT OF
THE EU COMMISSION CONSULTATION ON TECHNICAL DETAILS FOR A POSSIBLE EU
FRAMEWORK FOR BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION 56 (2011), http://www.ebf-
fbe.eu/uploads/documents/positions/BankingReg/3%2March%20201-EBF
ResponsejtoCOMCrisisManagement_- Consultation%20(final).pdf (pointing
out that predictions examining the market acceptance of such securities simply
do not exist with regard to the targeted approach to contingent capital);
Monroe Letter, supra note 100, at 2 (expressing concern that the Basel Commit-
tee's proposal would make contingent capital indistinguishable from common
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The trigger event or events to convert debt into equity are
especially contentious. Given their variety and possible combi-
nations, trigger designs may be categorized by their level of
uncertainty.' While institution-specific triggers would presuma-
bly grant most certainty to market participants, regulatory trigger
designs could provide lower levels of certainty." 7 CCS could be
converted incrementally to soften the negative effect of early or
late conversion. Jack Coffee suggests an incremental conversion
in a series of steps."'" Others prefer "carefully designed partial
or temporary write-downs within reasonable bounds.""o
equity and stating that the proposal "would change fundamentally the risk-
reward profiles of bank debt and equity investors, ultimately raising concerns
about the marketability of these instruments").
103. See GOLDMAN SACHS, EFFECTIVE REGUlATION, supra note 14, at 4 (sug-
gesting that contingent capital holdings equivalent to 6% of risk-weighted assets
would have been sufficient to have the firms recapitalize voluntarily instead of
converting the contingent capital); see also Goldman Sachs Global Market Inst.,
CONTINGENT CAPITAL: PossIaLrnll s, PROMISES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 20 (2011),
http://www2.goldniansachs.com/ideas/global-markets-institute/featured-
research/contingent-capital-doc-gmi-01-03-2011.pdf (analyzing the sizing of a
potential contingent capital market and estimating that the "potential amount
of contingent capital that might be issued starts with the Basel Committee's
requirement that all non-common Tier I and 2 securities eventually have a loss-
absorption feature") [hereinafter GODInMAN SACHS, CONTINGENT].
104. Other issues that remain open and debated are the specific trigger
mechanisms and whether the trigger is market value or risk-asset based. See, e.g.,
EAPB, Comments, supra note 102, at 1, 8-9. The EAPB proposes assurance that
when covering for loss, the ranking claim of capital instruments remains intact.
Id. Regarding the targeted approach, the EAPB questions how the appropriate
issuance level and cost will be determined and notes that a very limited group
of investors will be interested in these instruments. Id.; see also Hart & Zingales,
supra note 86, at 5-7 (provding an example of a market-based trigger); Stan
Maes & Wim Schoutens, Contingent Capital: An In-Depth Discussion 17 (2010)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1653877
(pointing out that contingent capital instruments "are very hard to value under
a particular model" and suggesting that the "extreme complexity" of CoCos
may hamper their success).
105. See supra note 104.
106. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 77 (showing in Graph I the difference
between institution-specific and systemic triggers).
107. Id.
108. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 830. Coffee prefers incremental conver-
sion in a series of steps arguing that incremental conversion enables an early
trigger for conversion. He uses the following example: "25% of the convertible
bonds might convert on a 25% stock price decline from the stock price on the
date of the bonds' issuance; another 25% might convert on a further 25%
decline, and the balance would convert if the stock price fell 75% (or more)
frout the original price." Id.
109. See Monroe Letter, supra note 100, at 4.
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The consequences of suboptimally designed triggers could
be substantial and could be an important reason for the empha-
sis in the debate on trigger designs and the concern over cer-
tainty of triggers. Converting CCS into equity prematurely at a
time when the financial institutions can still operate without an
equity capital injection could mean that the CCS capital injection
would no longer be available when the financial institution will
be unable to obtain other funding. In effect, the impact of the
equity capital injection would have dissipated and the financial
institution would no longer be able to use the CCS capital injec-
tion to borrow additional funds from other financial institutions.
On the other hand, converting CCS too late could make the
capital injection superfluous. At that stage, the financial institu-
tion may have experienced unresolvable financial difficulties that
may only marginally be softened with a capital injection. Espe-
cially if the financial institution entered the resolution stage, con-
verting CCS may not suffice to turn the entity around.
In addition to problems with possible trigger designs, the
issuance of contingent capital may involve other uncertainties.
CCS would have fixed returns (as debt security) while displaying
risk-bearing properties (similar to equity)."o While a nascent
market in CCS evolves, it is unclear in the long-run how desirable
investors will find conversion features that turn a debt holder
into an equity holder."' Even if a reliable trigger mechanism
could be designed, how predictable the circumstances would be
in which a conversion from debt into equity would be triggered is
unclear."' The uncertainty involved in buying contingent capi-
tal securities could deter investors." 3 Also unclear is if and how
110. See DG Market, supra note 87, at 90. ("[The] higher cost of such
instruments may simply reflect the view that risk has been transferred from soci-
ety to the bondholder by the removal of the implicit State guarantee for credi-
tors that may have artificially reduced the costs of debt funding. This may in
particular be the case for those institutions that have been considered 'too big
to fail."').
111. See id. (discussing the benefits "of replacing the original sharehold-
ers with converted debt holders, having particular regard of the need to avoid a
significant sale of newly-converted equity at a time when it is essential to restore
market confidence in the institution").
112. See id. ("[T]he Services of DG Internal Market and Services believe
that the resolution trigger is close to the point of failure for an institution, and
therefore should be linked to the probability of failure of a bank which is regu-
larly assessed by rating agencies and market participants. However, the Services
of DG Internal Market and Services recognize that holders of 'bail-in debt'
would want the trigger to be as transparent, objective and predictable as possi-
ble, and would welcome views on how this might be designed.").
113. But see infra Part V elaborating on the evolution of a market in con-
tingent capital securities.
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existing contingent capital design proposals will be able to
address information asymmetries and principal agent
problems.' 14
In sum, contingent capital without additional measures and
supplemental corporate governance improvements may not pre-
vent firm failure."' The real potential of contingent capital
could unfold if it would be used to supplement other corporate
governance improvements.
C. Application in Europe
Political pressures demanding adequate remedies to address
the perceived shortcomings of regulation increased dramatically
after the financial crisis. Constituencies in Europe increasingly
demanded that shareholders, management, and creditors share
equally in losses resulting from the failure of troubled SIFIs.'"
One possible remedy could be the issuance of contingent capital
securities. Legislatures in Europe appear to be taking the pros-
pect of contingent capital seriously. The EU Commission, the
Basel Committee, as well as the Swiss and German legislatures,
have approached contingent capital rules or rule proposals with
different degrees of intensity."' Some of the proposals are very
broad and will get narrowed down in the legislative process;
others, such as the German approach, merely set up a very basic
framework.
In an attempt to improve the restructuring and resolution of
financial institutions, the EU Commission proposed a compre-
114. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 18 (discussing how a second trigger
that increases voting rights could help minimize information asymmetries and
principal agent problems).
115. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 833 ("If a firm's variable costs clearly
exceed its revenues, and no turnaround is in sight, the firm will not be saved by
converting its bonds into preferred stock . . . [and] resolution authority pro-
vides the superior mechanism for its liquidation. Thus, the boundaries within
which contingent capital can feasibly work are set by the firm's ability to recover
its variable costs.").
116. See The Euro's Real Trouble: The Crisis of the Single Currency is Political as
Much as Financial, EcoNoMIST (Jily 14, 2011), http://www.economist.com/
node/18959279 (noting that Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European
Central Bank, demanded that future bail-outs must include "adequate partici-
pation of private creditors").
117. See Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums derJustiz, Gesetz zur
Anderung des Aktiengesetzes Feb. 11, 2010 (Ger.) (proposal to amend the
Stock Rights Act of 2011, presented by the Federal Ministry ofjustice); BANK OF
ENGIAND REPORT, supra note 3; DG Market, supra note 87; Swiss RIPoRT, supra
note 76; Press Release, BIS, supra note 97. For a summary and critical analysis
of European contingent capital proposals, see Henkel & Kaal, supra note 18.
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hensive and targeted approach.' 1 8 Under the comprehensive
approach, European resolution authorities can resolve which
classes of a financial institutions' debt may be converted to equity
or written down."' The financial situation of the respective
financial institution would determine the size of the write-
down.' 20
For purposes of assessing the potential of contingent capital
as corporate governance reform, the targeted approach of the
EU Commission could be more important. In contrast to the
comprehensive approach, the targeted approach would enable
resolution authorities to require credit institutions to issue a
fixed amount of pre-qualified debt that converts into equity upon
a statutory trigger."' The targeted approach may show that the
Commission appreciates the potential use of contingent capital
with a conversion feature. Contingent capital as envisioned in
the targeted approach (with a conversion feature) could find
application in the context of restructuring and resolutionl 22 but
also as a quasi preparation stage for bankruptcy12' and in going
concern as a preventive tool.124
Germany's legislature has recognized the potential of con-
tingent capital and proposed a change to the German Corpora-
tion Act, allowing the implementation of contingent capital. 25
German law had previously recognized a debt-equity swap.' 2 6
Unlike CCS, however, the debt-equity swap requires consent by
creditors.' 2 ' The proposed change to the German Corporation
Act would provide a statutory basis for the issuance of CCS in
Germany.1 28 The introduction of contingent capital securities in
118. See DG Market, supra note 87, at 88.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 89 ("[S]uch debt would need to include a contractual term
which would specify that the relevant resolution authority could use a statutory
power to write down the debt when the institution meets the trigger conditions
for entry into resolution.").
122. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 77 (discussing the use of contingent
capital with in European Union bank restructuring and resolution).
123. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 18.
124. Id.
125. See Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums der Justiz, supra note
117.
126. Gesetz zur Reorganisation von Kreditinstituten (Kreditinstitute-
Reorganizationsgesetz) [Act for the Reorganization of Credit Institutions] § 9,
1. [KredReorG] Dec. 9, 2010, BGBL. I, at 1900 (Ger.).
127. Id.
128. The reform of the German Corporation Act is centered around Sec-
tions 192, 194, and 221 (AktG). Under prior German Law, the instrument of
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Germany would require changes in other areas of German law.'2
BaFin, the German regulatory agency, may coordinate a possible
approach to contingent capital with the Basel Committee. The
use and application of contingent capital in Germany could
depend on the use of contingent capital in Basel III.'"
In an attempt to maintain the role of banking in Switzer-
land, the Swiss legislature may allocate 9.0% of the total core cap-
ital for SIFIs to contingent capital securities with predefined
triggers.'"' The Swiss approach distinguishes between high and
low CCS triggers.' FINMA, the Swiss regulatory agency, recom-
mended a "capital conservation buffer of 8.5% RWA [risk
weighted assets] on top of the Basel III minimum capital require-
ments for all banks of 4.5% RWA."'" The proposal also includes
a 6.0% of RWA surcharge for systemic risk, bringing the capital
requirement for Swiss SIFIs to 19.0% of RWA.' 4 In addition:
[T]he Swiss additional capital conservation buffer of 8.5%
RWA may consist of CoCos to a maximum of 3% RWA.
These CoCos must have a high trigger, forcing conversion
when the company's capital ratio undercuts 7% [Common
Equity Tier 1 (CETI)]. The progressive surcharge of 6%
RWA is planned to include only CoCos. As part of the res-
olution scheme, those CoCos conceptually convert at a
capital ratio of 5% CET1.13 5
"Mandatory Convertible Bonds" ("Pflichtwandelschuldverschreibung") had
already been recognized.
129. See Steffen Schneider & Markus Sohnchen, Rettung von Kreditinsti-
tuten in der Krise durch Contingent Convertible Bonds - Pflichtwandeschuldver-
schreibungen fur Banken ("CoCo-Bonds") [Rescue of Banks in Crisis Through
Contingent Capital Bonds - Mandatory Convertible Bonds for Banks], available at
http://www.forum-institut.de/fileadnin/data/Bereich 3/RettiingvonFinanz
instituten in der Krise.pdf (opining that the new Act would require a change
of the KWG, the Limited Act, the Corporation Act, the Bankruptcy Act and the
Bond Act ("Schuldverschreibungsgesetzes")).
130. See infra Part III.D discussing the recognition of contingent capital as
Tier I capital; see also Schneider & Sohnchen, supra note 129.
131. Swiss Ri.oRT, supra note 76, at 4; see Emma Thomasson, Swiss Parlia-
ment Committee Backs Tough Bank Rules, RiUTERS (Aug. 31, 2011), http://uk.
finance.yahoo.com/news/Swiss-parliament-committee-targetukfocus-22221247
83.html?x=0. This setup is known in the industry as the "Swiss Finish." Id. Leg-
islation to implement this proposal was approved by the upper house of the
Swiss legislature in August of 2011 and is expected to be approved by the lower
house and enacted in early 2012. Id.
132. Id.
133. FINMA, AnDRESSING "Too BIG To FAIL": THE. Swiss SIFI Poi.icv 1, 10
(2011), http://www.finma.ch/e/finma/publikationen/Dociiments/be-swiss-
SIFI-policy-june-201 1-sumiary-20110624-e.pdf.
134. Id. at 11.
135. Id. at 12.
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It is important to note that only two Swiss SIFIs, United Bank of
Switzerland ("UBS") and Credit Suisse, would be subjected to the
Swiss contingent capital regime. Partially because of the size of
these entities in comparison with the Swiss economy, the Swiss
have prudently adopted capital requirements that are more strin-
gent than the capital requirements under Basel III."' Credit
Suisse successfully issued contingent capital securities 1 7 whereas
UBS raised concerns over contingent capital. 3 s
In the United Kingdom, Lloyds Bank,' Rabobank,1 40 and
Barclays' 1 already issued or are in the process of issuing CCS.14 2
The Bank of England suggested that contingent capital will result
in higher loss-absorbency.14 3 As a remedy, the Bank of England
proposed precautionary and non-viability contingent capital.144
While CCS issuances in the United Kingdom seem to have estab-
lished a nascent market in contingent capital securities, regula-
tory guidance in the U.K. may have room for improvement.4 5
D. Recognition as Tier 1 Capital
Recognition of contingent capital as Tier 1 capital could
have significant implications for the market in contingent capital
securities. The marketing and sales of CCS could benefit if CCS
would be recognized as Tier 1 capital. However, the extent of
136. See Coffee, supra note 12, at 803 n.23.
137. See infra Part V discussing the Credit Suisse issuance.
138. Katharina Bart, UBS CFO Nixes CoCo Bonds; Mulls Other Loss-Absorbing
Capital, Dow JONES NEWS SERV. (July 26, 2011, 7:28 AM), http://online.wsj.
com/article/BT-CO-20110726-706411 .html.
139. See John Glover & Gavin Finch, Basel Committee Says Bondholders
Should Take Losses, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.busi-
nessweek.com/news/2010-08-19/basel-committee-says-bondholders-should-
take-losses.html.
140. See Dealbook, A Boost for Contingent-Capital Deals?, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar.
9, 2010, 4:33 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/03/09/a-boost-for-con-
tingent-capital-deals.
141. See Patrick Jenkins, Barclays Set to Follow Swiss Lead, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
14, 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f3c49ea-386e-11eO-959c-00144feabdcO.
html#axzzlSZdsn94g.
142. See George M. von Furstenberg, Contingent Capital to Strengthen the
Private Safety Net for Financial Institutions: CoCos to the Rescue?, (Deutsche
Bundesbank, Discussion Paper, Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies, No.
01/2011).
143. See BANK OF ENGLAND REPORT, supra note 3, at 36.
144. Id.
145. See U.K. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING, INTERIM REPORT:
CONSULTATION ON REFORM OPTIONS 73 (2011), http://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.
com/htcdn/Interim-Report-11041 1.pdf.
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recognition of contingent capital as Tier 1 capital is uncertain.'
The European Banking Authority ("EBA") is expected to allow
national regulators to use their existing Tier 1 definitions.'4 7 An
agreement on EU-wide standards for Tier 1 capital could face
many challenges. Germany uses wider definitions for Tier 1 capi-
tal,' 4 8 which can result in higher capital ratios. The Financial
Services Authority ("FSA") in the United Kingdom uses a stricter
definition of Tier 1 capital 4 9 and does not allow contingent capi-
tal (convertible bonds) to be classified as Tier 1 capital.'" Spain,
on the other hand, allows it.'5 '
Recognizing contingent capital as Tier 1 capital could have
beneficial attributes. Financial institutions in countries that use
stricter definitions on Tier 1 capital and do not recognize contin-
gent capital as Tier 1 capital could appear to have less capital and
thinner capital cushions than financial institutions in countries
with broader definitions for Tier 1 capital. Investors may per-
ceive less capital and capital cushions as a negative attribute.
Countries that recognize contingent capital as Tier 1 capital
could also give their financial institutions additional options for
complying with international capital adequacy requirements.
The Basel Committee has already considered contingent
capital and bail-in debt instruments for capital adequacy.'
Basel II and III allow the use of "Enhanced Capital Notes"1 and
permit the conversion of subordinated debt into equity."' How-
ever, the Basel Committee rejected requests from EU member
states to use CCS to satisfy the new capital buffers under Basel
146. See supra notes 117-45 and accompanying text (discussing the ten-
sion between the Basel Committee and the European Union in determining if
CCS will qualify as convertible instruments as Tier I capital).
147. See David Enrich, Europe Blinks on Bank Test: Regulators Seen Easing
'Stress'Gauge, Undercutting Effort to Restore Confidence, WAL. ST. J., Mar. 9, 2011, at
Al, A10.
148. For the German definition of the Tier I capital, see Gesetz fiber das
Kreditwesen [Kreditwesensgesetz - KWG] [German Banking Act] Sept. 9, 1998,
BGBL. I, 2776, as amended, §10, 12a (providing definitions of Tier 1 capital for
various financial institutions, partnerships, and companies; for public savings
and private savings banks, Tier I capital consists of the reserves).
149. Id.; see also Gregory J. Lyons et al., Basel Bank Resilience and Liquidity
Proposals Confirm the Global Paradigm Shift Toward Increased Financial Regulatory
Oversight, 137 BANKING L.J. 226, 239 ("[T]he FSA proposal would permit capital
instruments with 'step ups' and other incentives to redeem to count as Tier I
capital to a degree.").
150. See Enrich, supra note 147, at A10.
151. Id.
152. See Press Release, BIS, supra note 97, at 2.
153. See Glover & Finch, supra note 139.
154. Id.
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III." Instead, the Basel Committee requires SIFIs to use
retained earnings and ordinary shares to meet heightened capi-
tal requirements." Basel III calls for common equity Tier 1
requirements of at least 4.5% of risk weighted assets ("RWA"),
Tier 1 capital levels of at least 6.0% of RWA, and total capital of
at least 8.0% of RWA.' 7 Under Basel III, however, SIFIs are
"required to meet their additional loss absorbency requirement
with Common Equity Tier 1 only."'58 A proposal by the EU Com-
mission would allow contingent capital as an "additional Tier 1
instrument."' The EU Commission proposal defining contin-
gent capital as Tier 1 capital could be a first step towards a basic
framework for harmonized contingent capital standards. The
implications for the market in CCS could be significant. With a
harmonized Tier 1 status for CCS, EU member states would
receive guidance to set up rules for contingent capital that com-
ply with EU definitions. Alternatively, they could provide a basic
regulatory framework enabling SIFI-specific contingent capital
designs via private ordering.'6 0
155. See Louis, supra note 99.
156. Id.
157. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULA-
TORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 1, 12 (rev.
June 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf; see also Financial Regulatory
Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before the H. comm. on Financial Services,
112th Cong. 12 (2011) (statement of Hal S. Scott, Director of the Committee
on Capital Markets Regulation and Nomura Professor and Director of the Pro-
gram on International Financial Systems at Harvard Law School) ("Basel III,
when fully implemented by 2019, will require banks to hold 4.5% of common
equity and 6% of Tier I capital (up from 4%) of risk-weighted assets (RWAs).
Basel III also introduces additional capital buffers, a mandatory capital conser-
vation buffer of 2.5% and a discretionary countercyclical buffer, which allows
national regulators to require up to another 2.5% of capital during periods of
high credit growth."), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Uploaded
Files/06161 1scott.pdf.
158. Jung-moh Chang, Outlook for the Role of Contingent Capital, KCMI
(Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.kcmi.re.kr/Eng/cmweekly/downt.asp?num=43&
seq=1&filename=(2011-0823)Weekly eng.pdf.
159. See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms
PART I, at art. 48a, 49(1) (n), and 51(b), COM (2011) 452 final (July 20, 2011)
[hereinafter EU Commission Proposal], available at http://eur-lex.curopa.eu/Lex
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SPLITCOM:2011:0452(01):FIN:EN:PDF. If this
proposal will counterbalance the Basel Committee's decision to require
retained earnings and ordinary shares to meet heightened capital requirements
is unclear.
160. A possible model for such a framework could be the Swiss example.
See supra Part III.C.
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IV. ETHICAL DIMENSION OF CONTINGENT CAPITAL
The technical design features of contingent capital, possible
ethical implications, and the possible application of contingent
capital in corporate governance have not yet been evaluated sys-
tematically. Many constituents have an interest in the proper
functioning of contingent capital designs. Taxpayers, the respec-
tive governments and legislatures, the issuing SIFIs, SIFI manage-
ment, investment bankers, potential buyers, and actual holders
of CCS could have legitimate interests in well functioning and
social welfare maximizing designs for contingent capital
securities. 161
Taxpayers may have an interest in a contingent capital mar-
ket that facilitates the internalization of future bank failure cost
and avoids moral hazard. Similarly, governments could be inter-
ested in contingent capital rules to make markets safer, avoid
bailouts and moral hazard, curtail banks from taking risks, and
minimize systemic risk. While some SIFI issuers already issued
CCS to support their financing needs and improve marketing,162
mandatory issuance of CCS could create new challenges. SIFIs
could object to mandatory issuance requirements because of the
implicit compliance cost and the potential impact on business
strategies, a possible threat of change of control, and a possible
increase in overall uncertainty.
Change of control induced by CCS conversion could affect
SIFI management if management's employment is at risk. Other-
wise, management could embrace CCS as an efficient way of
financing with a positive marketing side effect. Investment bank-
ers and other consultants may benefit from the market in contin-
gent capital. They may capitalize on advisory and other fees and
may be able to create new or deepen existing consulting relation-
ships. Lastly, buyers of CCS are unlikely to have altruistic motives
for their purchase. They buy in sufficient numbers only if CCS
are a sound investment or at least appear by their design to be a
sound investment.
It is possible that the evolving market in contingent capital
securities will, for the most part, be built on private ordering. 3
If private ordering should not sufficiently protect the public
interest, for example, by decreasing the likelihood of future
161. See Henkel & Kaal, supra note 18, for a more thorough analysis of
constituents' incentives without a discussion of ethical implications.
162. Justin Baer et al., Credit Suisse Mulls Issuing Up to $30 Billion in 'CoCo'
Bonds, FINANCIAL TIMEs (Dec. 13, 2010, 2:35 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/
40635253/Credit Suisse Mulls Issuing-Up-to_30Billion inCocoBonds.
163. See supra Part III.C and infra Part V.
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bailouts, public ordering could be needed. If public ordering
should play a role, it would ideally provide a general framework
for contingent capital rules that enables experimentation.'" As
the Swiss experience shows,' 6 5 government authorities in various
jurisdictions may wish to make future government bailouts as
unlikely as possible to avoid burdening the taxpayer. At the same
time, regulators may desire to set up rules for CCS in a way that
makes it attractive enough for potential buyers to purchase these
securities and enable market proliferation and evolution.
Unintended consequences could result if a government pro-
gram requiring mandatory issuance of CCS should permit the
respective government and its central bank or other SIFIs to
purchase CCS."'
A. Adverse Effects
Contingent capital rules could also have unintended adverse
effects. Legal rules can have the independent authority to over-
ride moral reasoning' 7 and may, in certain settings, have the
164. The Swiss government has provided a general framework for the use
of contingent capital and capital adequacy. See supra Part III.C on the Swiss
Banking Act and contingent capital rules. See also infra Part VI on the benefits
of experimentation in an Institutional Economics framework.
165. See supra Part III.C on the Swiss Banking Act and other rules ena-
bling the issuance of contingent capital securities.
166. See infra Part VII.D on additional CCS design improvements.
167. Robin Bradley Kar, The Two Faces of Morality: How Evolutionary Theory
Can Both Vindicate and Debunk Morality (with a Special Nod to the Growing Impor-
tance of Law), in LIII NoMos: EvoI.UTION AND MoRALrrY 72-75 (forthcoming
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1834965. In Kar's argument for
legal parallelism, he explains:
[I]t is logically possible to have more than one natural sense of obliga-
tion, each of which functions in many identical ways, by appearing to
us to have precisely the same set of practical implications . . . . Moral-
ity and law nevertheless engage different classes of obligata, which are
better or worse suited to different classes of social contract
problems . . . [and] a shared social psychology that naturally inclines
us to defer to a smaller group of officials to determine the content of
what the law requires, and that allows these officials to learn a shared
and technical form of legal judgment .... Our sense of moral obliga-
tion would thus be the product of long-term selective pressures, which
have left us with a very powerful and highly evolved perception of
moral authority; whereas our sense of legal obligation would have only
really come under heavy selective pressure quite recently (i.e. after the
rise of agriculture and the development of larger-scale civilization).
Id. at 72-75; see also Oliver Goodenough & Monika Gruter Cheney, Preface: Is
Free Enteprise Values in Action?, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL RoLE OF VAL-
UES IN THE ECONOMY xxiii, xxiii-xxiv (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008).
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capacity to actually encourage violations of rules, 8 or under-
mine the spontaneous workings of values."' Paul Zak provides
the following example:
In a recent experiment at two day care centers in Israel,
both with a rule in place that parents must pick up their
children no later than 4:00 PM, one imposed a fine of $3
for each time the child was picked up late. The other sim-
ply depended on the parents' following the rule with no
sanction for failing to do so. At the center that imposed a
fine, parents' mind-set apparently changed; the fine
seemed to remove the implicit social sanction associated
with being late, because now one just had to pay a penalty.
Over a three-week period, the day care center with the fine
saw twice as many parents arriving late, and the proportion
of latecomers remained steady thereafter (even after the
fines were terminated!). The lesson here is that oversight
and penalties may crowd out the good behaviors that most
people, most of the time, follow.'7 0o
While contingent capital rules are expected to make finan-
cial institutions more resilient, prepare financial institutions for
future financial downturns, and minimize moral hazard and sys-
temic risk, they could theoretically give decision makers a false
sense of security. If the market in contingent capital securities
should evolve with CCS designs that provide sufficient protec-
tions and guard against systemic risks and contagion, it seems
theoretically possible that decision makers could rely on the
design of CCS and neglect their role as monitors.
Operating under the illusion of heightened protections by a
possible CCS regime, in combination with the misguided belief
in the efficient functioning of a possibly flawed contingent capi-
tal design, decision makers could feel encouraged to continue
engaging in business practices that result in high social cost.
This could mean that contingent capital rules could actually con-
tribute to overriding decision maker's moral reasoning. In that
case, contingent capital could actually increase risk incentives for
SIFIs that are too big to fail.
While stricter controls, corporate governance constraints,
and stronger regulatory pressure can incentivize financial institu-
168. See Goodenough & Cheney, supra note 167, at xxiii-xxiv.
169. Id.
170. Paul J. Zak, Values and Value: Moral Economics, in MORAL MARKETS:
THE CRITICAL Rot; OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 167, at 259, 265
(citations omitted).
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tions to act more prudently and to avoid excessive risk taking,"'
the regular corporate governance controls may not work in SIFIs.
SIFIs are often considered too big to fail and may be bailed out.
If that is the case, SIFI leaders may anticipate a bail-out commit-
ment and may be incentivized to shift their risk preferences
upwards. If the SIFI has issued CCS, decision makers in SIFIs
could shift their risk preferences towards even higher risk
profiles.' 7 2
In effect, switching to CCS financing could reinforce risk
incentives and these distorted risk incentives could create draw-
backs for CCS issuances.'7  Given the nascent state of the market
in contingent capital securities, 174 it seems unlikely that these
drawbacks could materialize in the near future. Evaluating risk
incentives during the drafting process, however, could help
address the inherent drawbacks early in the evolution of the mar-
ket in CCS.
B. Conflicts of Interest
The mandatory issuance of contingent capital securities
could result in unintended consequences and conflicts of inter-
est. Given the range of public sector injections into struggling
financial institutions during the financial crisis, an EU Commis-
sion proposal suggests that a mandatory minimum issuance of
contin ent capital could range from 8% to 19% of risk weighted
assets.' Others believe the range of mandatory contingent capi-
tal issuance would more likely be between 4% and 8% of risk
weighted assets. 171
In a voluntary issuance, SIFIs may buy CCS from other SIFIs
if the coupon rate and ratings offer sufficiently attractive fea-
tures. Under a regime requiring mandatory CCS issuance, how-
ever, SIFIs and other financial institutions could desire to
171. See generally Tao-Hsien Dolly King & Min-Ming Wen, Shareholder Gov-
ernance, Bondholder Governance, and Managerial Risk-Taking, 35 J. BANKING & FIN.
512, 512-31 (2011) (showing that strong bondholder governance incentivizes
low-risk investments); Bertrand Rime, Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour:
Empirical Evidence for Switzerland, 25J. BANKING & FIN. 789, 789-805 (2001); Ron-
ald E. Shrieves & Drew Dahl, The Relationship Between Risk and Capital in Commer-
cial Banks, 16 J. BANKING & FIN. 439, 439-57 (1992).
172. See Koziol & Lawrenz, supra note 16, at 98 (explaining that with
CoCo bonds, manager-owners face distorted risk incentives since disciplining
impact is mitigated). Contra Flannery, supra note 13, at 12 (finding that share-
holders confront undistorted risk-bearing incentives).
173. See Koziol & Lawrenz, supra note 16, at 98.
174. See infra Part V.
175. See DG Market, supra note 87, at 89 n.24.
t76. See GOLDMAN SACHS, CONTINGENT, supra note 103.
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purchase the contingent capital securities of their competitors
not because of their economic desirability but rather to fulfill
their regulatory obligations. A detrimental result of such a prac-
tice could be CCS cross holdings among SIFIs. Cross holdings of
CCS by SIFIs could undermine the effectiveness of CCS and its
ability to limit systemic risk and contagion.
SIFIs have previously used and continue to use similar busi-
ness strategies to stay competitive. Rules promulgated in the
aftermath of the financial crisis in Europe and the United States
may not substantially and sustainably change the business strate-
gies and risk profiles of major financial institutions.'" With simi-
lar risk profiles and CCS positions in similarly exposed entities,
SIFIs could be hesitant to vote for necessary organizational
changes or otherwise exercise their voting rights on a competitor
after conversion of CCS into equity. This could especially hold
true in the case of CCS cross holdings and if the respective com-
petitor should hold a CCS position with similar voting rights.
Without CCS cross holdings, SIFIs could be tempted to exercise
their voting rights against the interests of the competitor if a con-
version to equity should have been triggered.
V. EVOLVING MARKET IN CONTINGENT CAPITAL
The scope and depth of the market in CCS could depend on
many factors, including the level of convergence in CCS designs
and issuance volumes.'" European banks have already recog-
nized the benefits of CCS and are issuing CCS despite lacking
regulatory guidance."' CCS coupon rates between 7% and 9.5%
attracted sufficient investor interest and seem to have established
a sustainable market in these securities."s The European market
in CCS was initially built mostly on hedge fund and retail investor
purchases and later included asset managers and pension
funds.'"' In late 2009, in the first issuance of its kind, Lloyds
raised £8.5 billion of contingent core Tier 1 and core Tier 1
177. New capital adequacy rules may have changed the profitability of
banks. See Eric Dash, Profits Falling, Banks Confront a Leaner Future, N.Y. TiMEs,
Aug. 29, 2011, at Al, At2.
178. See GOLDMAN SACHS, CONTINGENT, supra note 103.
179. See infra Part VII.B.
180. Telephone Interview with Barry Donlon, Capital Solutions
Desk-CoCo Buy-Side, United Bank of Switzerland ("UBS") (Sept. 7, 2011)
[hereinafter Donlon Interview].
181. Id. (noting that hedge hinds began to be interested in CoCos at an
interest rate of around 15%).
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notes through a non-U.S. bond-exchange offer.'12 The bonds
Lloyds exchanged for new debt had been trading below face
value because of the bank's financial troubles.'83  Investor
demand for the exchange offer exceeded $2.7 billion, almost
three times the amount on offer, which prompted Lloyds to issue
the maximum of $986 million of enhanced capital notes
("ECN")." These bonds were designed to convert into equity if
Lloyds core Tier 1 capital ratio fell below 5%."'
In a similarly successful issuance in 2011, Credit Suisse
agreed to sell about 6 billion Swiss francs ($6.17 billion) of con-
tingent convertible bonds to shareholders in Qatar and Saudi
Arabia in an exchange offer.' Qatar Holding LLC and The
Olayan Group hold the notes in exchange for cash or Tier 1 capi-
tal notes that the bank sold to a group of investors including
Qatar and Olayan in 2008.'
In addition to the exchange offer, Credit Suisse also issued
$2 billion worth of contingent capital bonds. The bonds, offered
to Asian and private investors, among others, were placed with a
coupon of 7.875% to 8.125%, less than initially expected.' 8
Demand for the offering was robust, attracting orders of around
$22 billion.' Asset managers bought about two-thirds of the
Credit Suisse CoCo offering, while private banks purchased the
182. See Kathy Sandler & Margot Patrick, Lloyds Raises $14 Billion in Bond
Exchange, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014
24052748704779704574553021875626720.html.
183. Id.
184. See Clara Ferreira-Marques, UPDATE 1 - Lloyds Gets Strong Demand for
U.S. Bond Exchange, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2009, 5:23 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2009/12/08/lloyds-idUSGEE5B70QB20091208.
185. Id.
186. See Elena Logutenkova & Matthias Wabl, Credit Suisse Raises $6.2 Bil-
lion from Qatar Holding, Olayan, BI.OOMBERc (Feb. 14, 2011, 4:22 AM) http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-14/credit-suisse-places-sf6-billion-in-tier-1-
buffer-capital-notes.html.
187. Id. Qatar Investment Authority, an affiliate of Qatar Holding, has a
6.17% stake in Credit Suisse. Olayan owns 6.61% in Credit Suisse through Cres-
cent Holding GmbH. Qatar and Olayan of Saudi Arabia were among investors
that Credit Suisse approached for 10 billion francs in October 2008.
188. See Maria Sheahan, Credit Suisse Places $2 bln Worth of CoCos - Paper,
REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2011, 2:08 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/
17/creditsuisse-cocos-idUSLDE71GO4H20110217. These Credit Suisse CoCos
were expected to carry a BBB+ rating from Fitch and be listed on the Euro-MTF
exchange.
189. See Matthew Attwood & Jane Merriman, UPDATE 2 - Credit Suisse
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remaining one-third on behalf of their clients."n A total of 550
different investors-an unusually large number-put in orders
for the bonds.'"' The strong demand from asset managers was
particularly important because they were expected to form the
backbone of a sustainable market for the products.'
In another offering, the Bank of Cyprus, Cyprus's largest
bank, had planned to issue up to C1.34 billion in convertible
enhanced capital securities to bolster its capital adequacy
ratios. 193 The bank had received subscriptions worth around
C890 million ($1.28 billion) for an enhanced CoCos issue, fall-
ing short of its target. 94 Subscriptions totaling C696 million
were in the form of exchange of existing eligible securities.'9 5
These combined offerings suggest that the European market
in CCS is sustainable. It is noteworthy, however, that the Credit
Suisse offering has so far been the only CCS offering not involv-
ing an exchange element. While banks appreciate the benefits
of CCS and hope to issue these securities, the lack of regulatory
guidance still creates roadblocks for successful issuances.'" Reg-
ulators appear hesitant to give guidance in a market and regula-
tory environment with a significant number of open issues and
uncertainty.' Issuing contingent capital is an expensive
endeavor and the expense may only seem economically justified
if regulatory uncertainties have been adequately addressed. The
lack of supply is affecting funds specializing in CCS.
There is some evidence that investors in the United States
are interested in contingent capital securities, despite lacking
190. SeeJennifer Hughes, Credit Suisse CoCos Issue Deluged, FIN. Timns (Feb.




193. See Michele Kambas, Bank of Cyprus CoCos Subscription Misses Target,




196. See Donlon Interview, supra note 180; see also Harry Wilson, Barclays
Finalises Plans for Retail Split, DAILY TELEGRAPH (une 13, 2011), http://dailytele
graph.newspaperdirect.com/epaper/viewer.aspx?issue=1222201106130000000
0001001 &page= I &article=a2d5ed3e-fl f4-460b-8290-70e8f-9981ee8&key=pxlgVfx
YtJWArMoeijS2Aw=&feed=rss. Barclay's Bank is expected to issue a trial bond
of about E250 million to assess investor appetite. FSA approval is expected
soon.
197. See Donlon Interview, supra note 180. For a discussion on open
issues relating to contingent capital, see supra Part III.B.
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regulatory guidance.' 8 In comparison with the European CCS
offerings, however, contingent capital in the United States could
evolve differently. The debt and equity markets in the United
States are structurally different from European markets. The
experience in the United States with Trust Preferred Securities
and High Yield "Junk" bonds could give U.S. market participants
a different perspective on contingent capital securities. In com-
parison with European CCS offerings, the U.S. regulatory envi-
ronment could result in structurally different CCS offerings in
the United States. The eventual depth of the U.S. market in con-
tingent capital could depend on pricing and the coupon rate."
The combination of investor interest and an underdevel-
oped regulatory structure in the United States, pertaining to this
market segment, could present a unique opportunity to experi-
ment with contingent capital designs and their possible applica-
tion in corporate governance of SIFIs.
VI. BENEFITS OF EXPERIMENTATION
The political economy of financial regulation ensures that
after the Dodd-Frank-induced expansion of regulatory oversight
there will be a subsequent phase of relaxation of regulatory over-
sight.200 Historical evidence shows that the introduction of regu-
latory regimes after a crisis,201 is often followed by a gradual
easing of regulatory strictures. 202 The real challenge is to set up
a regulatory structure that allows regulators to continually adapt
198. Telephone Conference Interview with Todd Mahoney, CoCo Buy-
Side, & John Haas, UBS Capital Solutions Group, United Bank of Switzerland
(Sept. 9, 2011).
199. Id.
200. Coffee, supra note 12, at 795.
201. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1591 (2005) (describing the
effects of swiftly-enacted regulations in response to a financial crisis); see
Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark 1 (Dec. 18, 2011) (unpublished man-
uscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974148 (recommending "auto-
matic subsequent review" and "regulatory exemptive or waiver powers" to
remedy possible perverse unintended consequences of foundational financial
legislation); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Corporate Governance
Round II, 95 MINN. L. RE-v. 1779, 1786-88. Contra Brett H. McDonnell, Don't
Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a Financial Crisis 36
(Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-09, 2011), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract= 1753760.
202. See Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and
Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 393, 395 (2006); see generally
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don't "Screw Joe the Plummer": The Sausage-Making of
Financial Reform (Nov. 11, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:/
/ssrn.com/abstract= 1925431.
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to new market environments, financial innovation, and to
changes in financial markets as a result of financial regulation.
Appropriate capacities to adapt regulation may require the right
set of incentives for regulators.
Economic benefits of financial rules are usually described
from the vantage point of rational actors who are utility-maximiz-
ing. Other core assumptions of this model include: scarcity of
resources, methodological individualism, and self-interested
rational behavior. Rational actors in this model are designing
legal rules and adjudicating disputes over those rules on the sup-
ply side. Other rational actors use those legal rules to govern
their relationships on the demand side.
While the core assumptions of the neoclassical model are
shared, New Institutional Economics ("NIE") replaces the
assumption of full rationality with bounded rationality,"o com-
plemented by the assumption of opportunistic behavior.20
Many of NIE's modified assumptions have found their way into
modern economic analysis of financial markets and financial
rules. 20s5 NIE is a relatively young offspring of economic theory
focusing on the functioning and development of institutions
(positive analysis), suggesting proposals for improving existing
institutions (normative analysis), and supporting impact analysis
and comparative impact analysis of present regulatory structures
and de legeferenda solutions.2 06
Institutional economics stresses that information is systemat-
ically incomplete.o' Institutions are defined as general rules or
203. See STEFAN VOIGT, INSTITUTIONENOKONOMIK [INSTITUTIONAI. EcoNo(-
ws] 22-23 (2d ed. 2009).
204. Id. at 88-89; EIRIK G. FuRuBoTN & RunoiF RICHTE.R, INSTITUTIONS
AND ECONoMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEw INSTITUTIONAL Eco-
NOMics 5 (2d ed. 2005).
205. HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAV-
IORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 9-10 (2002); ANDRI
SHIFIFER, INEFFICIE.NT MARKETS: AN INTRODUcTION TO BEHAVIORAi FINANCE 10
(2000).
206. See Furubotn & Richter, supra note 204, at 35-37; DouiCAss C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PIRFORMANCE 3
(1990); Runoi.F RICHTIR & EIRIK G. FuRUBOTN, NUE INSTITUTIONENOKONOMIK
[NI'w INSTITUTIONAL EcoNOMIcs] (3d ed. 2003); OLIVER E. WILLIAIMSON, THE
EcoNoMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-16 (1985); VOIcT, supra note 203;
Christian Kirchner, Public Choice and New Institutional Economics: A Comparative
Analysis in Search of Co-operation Potentials, in Punlic ECONOMICS AND PuBLIc
CHOICE 19, 32 (Pio Baake & Rainald Borck eds., 2007); Ronald Coase, The New
Institutional Economics, 88 Am. EcoN. REv. 72, 72-74 (1998); Oliver E. William-
son, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. &
EcoN. 233, 233 (1979).
207. See Voigt, supra note 203, at 237-38.
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sets of general rules, together with their enforcement mecha-
nisms.208 Regardless of whether they are created by a legislature
or by a private standard setter, legal rules and standards are
regarded as institutions if they are enforced. 209 NIE recognizes
that limiting the analysis to a subset of formal institutions would
ignore important problems and therefore emphasizes the impor-
tance of informal institutions, such as social norms.2 10
Corporate governance issues often involve formal and infor-
mal institutions. NIE's approach, including formal and informal
institutions in the analysis, is particularly helpful in this context.
Experimentation, observation, and rule revision are seen as part
of an ongoing process that may never end with a stable "optimal"
rule. 2 11 Experimentation can result in a learning process that
can improve the quality of legal rules. Harmonization and coor-
dination can help facilitate experimentation and a learning pro-
cess, but experimentation is probably most effective when several
different approaches can be tried simultaneously in different
jurisdictions. In this process, jurisdictions experiment with dif-
ferent rules and discover which rules do or do not work. If
underlying economic circumstances change, suggesting that a
different rule might be optimal, it is more likely that some juris-
diction will try a different rule, and will do so more quickly, than
if all jurisdictions felt compelled to agree upon the same rule.
Contingent capital rules and privately negotiated contingent
capital offerings, as a potential subset of corporate governance
rules for SIFIs, could benefit from a process of experimentation
and learning. It is likely that the underlying economic condi-
tions will change. The experimentation with different CCS rules
and a mixture of market solutions, private ordering, and
mandatory rules in different jurisdictions could help avoid a "sta-
ble rule" and permit dynamic regulation. 212 Contingent capital
could help facilitate an incentive structure that allows regulators
to rely partially on private ordering for the design of CCS.
208. See FURUnOTN & RICHTER, supra note 204, at 7; VOIGT, supra note 203.
209. See VOICT, supra note 203.
210. Id.
211. For background on experimentation with legal rules in the context
of jurisdictional competition, see Christian Kirchner, Richard W. Painter &
Wulf A. Kaal, Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law After Inspire Art:
Unbundling Delaware's Product for Europe, 2 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. RFv. 159
(2009) (discussing this phenomenon in the evolution of European corporate
law).
212. See infra Part VII.C on Dynamic SIFI regulation.
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VII. CONTINGENT CAPITAL IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance constraints and stronger regulatory
pressure can incentivize financial institutions to act more pru-
dently.2"' Because the regular corporate governance controls
may not work in SIFIS2 14 changing the existing corporate govern-
ance structures pertaining to SIFIs could be desirable.'" Such
an undertaking could be faced with significant path dependen-
cies. Half a century of financial innovation and basic precepts of
the capitalist legal system, such as limited liability2 " and the busi-
ness judgment rule, 1 may not be easily circumnavigated. But,
political and financial systems could be more amenable to
changes in corporate governance when systemically significant
financial institutions are involved."'" Especially in the vicinity of
bankruptcy, the threat of systemic implications could suffice for
the respective constituents to support a change in the corporate
governance structure.
A. A Quasi-Public Good
CCS could have the potential to approximate quasi-public
good characteristics. Similar to the difficulty of excluding ships
from using the services of a lighthouse, ' 1 SIFIs may benefit from
the issuance of CCS by other SIFIs if the CCS design minimizes
systemic risk and contagion. Increased use of these securities
could have the potential to maximize social welfare by decreasing
the likelihood of future bailouts, minimizing systemic risk, and
avoiding contagion.
CCS's potential for welfare maximization could depend on
how much leeway possible future contingent capital rules in the
United States will give to industry groups and private parties in
designing CCS features. If European developments are at all a
213. See supra note 171.
214. See supra Part IV.A.
215. See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder
Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 Si.:ATLEri.
U. L. Ri:v. 1173, 1175 (2010) [hereinafter Hill & Painter, Personal Liability]; see
also Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Compromised Fiduciaries: Conflicts of Interest in
Government and Business, 95 MINN. L. Rix. 1637 (2011).
216. See Hill & Painter, Personal Liability, supra note 215 (elaborating on
the prospect of reintroducing personal liability of investment bankers).
217. See Kaal & Painter, supra note 3 (describing changes in the context
of the bnsiness judgment rule and comparing German and U.S. rules).
218. Christian Kirchner, Corporate Governance and Ordnungs6konomik
[and Order Economics] (providing general information on the economic
dimensions of corporate governance) (on file with author).
219. See R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 357,
357-76 (1974).
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guide for the United States, the larger part of the design features
may be left to private ordering. The benefits of private ordering
could include increased flexibility, increased placements, and a
higher volume of CCS issuances. Market participants may better
assess their own needs than regulators. Private parties and their
advisors may have the adequate and relevant level of information
to contribute to the evolution of a sustainable U.S. market in
CCS.
A downside of private ordering could be that private parties
may not necessarily structure CCS design features with a view
towards: the common good, ethical behavior of SIFI leaders,
avoiding future bailouts, limiting systemic risk, and contagion.
The social welfare maximization potential of CCS could be lower
if the design features are entirely left to private ordering. There
is a risk that the discretion implied in private ordering could
eventually make mandatory rules necessary. Too much involve-
ment by regulators, on the other hand, could result in overreach-
ing with the associated negative effects. The study on the
feasibility of contingent capital as required by section 115(c) of
the Dodd-Frank Act220 could be an opportunity for assessing the
optimal level of government involvement.
B. Reform from Within
Ethically questionable conduct of SIFI management could
be attributable to different factors. Factors such as cultural
forces, 221 industry pressure, institutional pressure, and peer pres-
sure could influence the decision making process of SIFI man-
agement. Influenced by strong institutional and cultural forces,
decision makers may have a tendency to compartmentalize their
lives and disconnect their moral reasoning from their actions in
the workplace.2 22 It is possible that even a SIFI leader with
strong personal values and moral precepts could engage in ques-
220. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 115(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1404-05 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5325 (Supp. IV 2011)).
221. See generally Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical
Relationship of Professionalism to Effectiveness in the Practice of Law, 24 GFO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 137 (2011) (providing empirical analysis as to how professionalism
enhances moral decision making).
222. See Richard Painter, The Moral Responsibilities of Investment Bankers, 8
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5 (2010); see also Lyman Johnson, Beyond the Inevitable and
Inadequate Regulation of Bankers: A Comment on Painter, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 29
(2011); Johan J. Graafland & Bert W. van de Ven, The Credit Crisis and the Moral
Responsibility of Professionals in Finance (European Banking Center Discussion
Paper No. 2011-012, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809752
("[A] return to the core virtues in the financial sector will therefore only suc-
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tionable conduct. As a result of this compartmentalization, SIFI
leaders may engage in business practices that they would not
apply to their personal lives. Knowingly taking risks they cannot
control," and ultimately burdening the general public,224 could
be a result of a combination of these factors.
To remedy the ethically questionable conduct resulting
from compartmentalization, Richard Painter proposes self-
restraint by bankers through self-interest and an open dialogue
about morality: "Bankers . . . need to talk with each other and
with the rest of society about morality .... [T] here needs to be a
conversation about one's personal sense of right and wrong."225
LymanJohnson suggests: "[M]eaningful reform of banking must
come from within banks themselves and from those who counsel
and educate bankers."2 2 6 Others argue for remodeling profes-
sionalism in business and law, 227 and greater participation by civil
society.2 2" Another approach could be for a banking entity to
signal to its relevant market that it will adhere to stricter stan-
dards-ethical or otherwise.229
The issuance of contingent capital securities with a conver-
sion feature could signal adherence to stricter standards. Credit
Suisse, the Swiss bank, has already issued $2 billion worth of con-
vertible contingent capital bonds.co An unusually large number
of 550 different investors put in orders for the bonds.2 1' The
issuance attracted orders of around $22 billion, more than
eleven times oversubscription. 23 2 It is difficult to ascertain the
possible signaling effect or reform potential of this issuance.
ceed if a renewed sense of responsibility in the sector is supported by institu-
tional changes that allow banks to put their mission into practice.").
223. See supra notes 27-66 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
225. Painter, supra note 222, at 15, 17.
226. Johnson, supra note 222, at 35.
227. See generally Rob Atkinson, Assessing the Foundations of Neo-Classical Pro-
fessionalism in Law and Business: Remodeling the Temple, Phase I (Fla. St. U. Coll. of
Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 537, 2011), available at http://ssrn.comi/
abstract= 1924400.
228. See Claire R. Kelly, Financial Crises and Civil Society, 11 Ci-. J. INT'l L.
505, 537 (2011).
229. See Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Struc-
ture of Markets, 92 Am. EcoN. Rtev. 434 (2002).
230. See supra notes 189-192.
231. See Hughes, supra note 190.
232. See Attwood & Merriman, supra note 189.
233. At the time of publication of this Article, the author had not been
able to obtain internal documents from Credit Suisse that could have helped
with an evaluation and assessment of motives for the issuance, internal govern-
ance reform, or potential for ethical leadership.
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While the issuance may largely be a response to regulatory
changes in Switzerland,234 at a minimum, Credit Suisse seems to
be signaling to its customers and market participants that it rec-
ognizes a future role of contingent capital securities.235 Credit
Suisse has opted to provide capital ratio triggers and supervisory-
based triggers in its CCS issuance.23 6 Both triggers are intended
to avoid public sector support237 and could help maximize social
welfare. Whether contingent capital securities will also have a
role in the governance of financial institutions might depend on
the choices of legislatures and regulatory authorities, as well as
private ordering.
Financial institutions seem to be following Credit Suisse's
example.2" There is some evidence that contingent capital
could play a role in the governance of financial institutions.
Most notably, Barclays has issued contingent capital securities to
its executives as deferred incentive awards."' While commercial
motives are certain to have played a major role in the CCS issu-
ance by Credit Suisse and Barclays, the use of contingent capital
to avoid public sector support and to compensate executives
234. See supra Part III.C on Swiss rules. See also Press Release, Credit
Suisse, Credit Suisse Group Executes Agreement to Put in Place CHF 6 Billion
of Tier 1 Buffer Capital Notes, a Form of Contingent Capital (Feb. 14, 2011),
available at https://www.credit-suisse.com/news/en/media-release.jsp?ns=
41709 (stating that "[t]his form of contingent capital will satisfy an estimated
50% of the high trigger contingent capital requirement under FINMA rules as
part of the proposed Swiss TBTF-regime" and that contingent convertible
bonds will be used exclusively to strengthen the bank's equity capital base in
compliance with regulatory requirements).
235. Id. (statement of Brady W. Dougan, Chief Executive Officer of
Credit Suisse Group: "We see this transaction as a significant development for
Credit Suisse Group and our industry as we believe that it will put to rest con-
cerns about the attractiveness of these instruments to investors. This is one of a
number of steps we have taken to ensure that we are at the forefront of industry
developments and it underscores our commitment to creating a sustainable
business model for the new environment.").
236. See Gregg Rozansky, The Loss Absorbency Requirement and "Contingent
Capital" Under Basel III, 23 EUROWATCH 1, 5 (2011).
237. Id.
238. See supra Part III.C discussing the pipeline of possible issuances and
interest from other banks in the United Kingdom.
239. See Rob Cox, A Pay System That May Please, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 2010, at
B2 ("CoCos would not merely constitute a compensation fig leaf. Throwing the
securities into bankers' stockings better aligns their interests with those of regu-
lators hoping to avoid a repeat of the taxpayer bailouts of the last financial
crisis."); see also BARCLAYS, BARCLAYS PLC ANNUAL REPORT 2010, 167 (stating that
"deferred incentive awards for 2010 are made under the Share Value Plan
(SVP) in the form of Barclays share and under the Contingent Capital Plan
(CCP) in the form of contingent capital awards."), available at http://www.bar
claysannualreports.com/ar20l0/files/AnnualReport-2010.pdf.
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could be a first step towards corporate governance reform from
within, with potentially larger implications. Contingent capital in
executive compensation could play a role in corporate govern-
ance. 24() Additional research may be needed to ascertain the
reform potential.
C. Increased Voting Rights
Issuing contingent capital securities with a conversion fea-
ture could provide SIFIs with an opportunity to introduce institu-
tion-specific (privately negotiated) reform without regulatory
interference.2 4 ' At the core of a possible application of contin-
gent capital as corporate governance reform from within the
respective institution could be a contingent capital design with a
voting rights increase.
Voting rights increases after conversion of contingent capi-
tal into equity have many applications. It could create a quasi
preparation stage for bankruptcy2 4 2 but could also have larger
applications for corporate governance. The possible application
of a voting rights increase could become clearer as the market
for contingent capital securities evolves.
By issuing CCS with increased voting rights, SIFIs could sig-
nal to their respective markets and investors the adherence to
stricter ethical standards. If SIFIs issue CCS, either voluntarily or
by way of a mandatory issuance,2 4 3 they would be issuing finan-
cial instruments that would have the capacity to internalize bank
failure costs. With a design that increases voting rights, SIFIs
could implicitly lower risk-taking and allow for a form of indirect
and institution- specific corporate governance reform, i.e.,
increased checks and balances. 244 The increase of institution-
specific checks and balances could signal to the respective mar-
ket that the SIFI is adhering to stricter ethical standards.
A voting rights increase could have the potential to change
and improve the incentive structure for the constituents of SIFIs.
240. See Kaal, supra note 94.
241. As noted earlier, leaving the CCS design features entirely to private
ordering could result in increased social cost.
242. Henkel & Kaal, supra note 18 (expounding on the use of a voting
rights increase to create a quasi preparation stage before bankruptcy).
243. For a prior discussion on the benefits of a mandatory issuance of
subordinated debt instruments see CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS, THE PoSTM0oERN
BANK SAFETY NET: LESSONS FROM DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING EcoNOMIES
(1997) (suggesting that subordinated debt holders should ideally be unrelated
foreign financial institutions); Douglas D. Evanoff, Preferred Sources of Market Dis-
cipline, 10 YALE . ON REG. 347 (1993).
244. See supra Part VII.B.
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Under a contingent capital regime with a voting rights increase,
management, shareholders, and creditors are similarly affected
because the conversion feature can change the power, depen-
dency, and perhaps even the control dynamic in the SIFI. With
its impact on control dynamics and incentives for the respective
constituents in SIFIs, CCS could help fill a void left by regulators'
insufficiencies in monitoring and supervising financial
institutions.
The possibility of increased dilution that comes with
increased voting rights could lower incentives for SIFT leaders to
take risks. Increased dilution could also result in a change of
control or at least the threat thereof. This could change the cor-
porate governance dynamic in the SIFI. The threat of change of
control through CCS holders could provide SIFI leaders with a
higher level of independence from shareholder demands. It
could allow SIFI leaders to increasingly act in accordance with
their moral convictions and conscience because the threat of
change of control may influence SIFT leaders to take fewer risks
to avoid triggering the conversion of CCS and a possible change
of control. To avoid the trigger, shareholders may allow SIFI
leaders more discretion with regard to risk taking and the
expected returns on equity.
Corporate governance improvements for SIFIs via a CCS
design with a voting rights increase could also increase the threat
of loss of employment and career opportunities for SIFI leader-
ship. CCS holders combined with other interested (institutional)
shareholders could be in a position to demand corrective action
by SIFI leadership if their actions should have taken the SIFI into
a market segment that turned out to be excessively risky and
endangered the future of the organization. 245
The threat of loss of employment and reputational harm
could influence management decision making before conversion
of CCS and thereafter. More importantly, management incen-
tives for risk control could be heightened upon conversion, espe-
cially if management knows that CCS holders would have a
majority vote upon conversion (with or without institutional
shareholders). The level of influence of CCS holders and their
control over management could largely depend on the volume
of CCS issuance. However, the potential shift in the power struc-
ture within a SIFI, alone, could increase management accounta-
bility and improve decisions by SIFI leadership.
Given these possible corporate governance improvements
for SIFIs, perhaps the market in CCS could one day be under-
245. See examples supra Part II.
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stood, in the words of Lyman Johnson, as a "moral institution [1]
not just an economic phenomen [on]."" Moreover, through
the supply and demand of CCS, pricing of CCS could be under-
stood as an implicit indicator to determine how much people
care about market integrity and moral hazard. This would imply,
however, altruistic motives of CCS purchasers. It is unclear if
altruism in CCS purchases would be realistic. The nascent mar-
ket in CCS seems to have been built on investors' expectation of
above-average returns.247
D. Additional Considerations
A contingent capital design with voting rights could help
improve corporate governance in SIFIs. Nevertheless, additional
design improvements could be warranted and may be accom-
plished with minimal additional costs. While the details of the
design of the respective CCS should be left to industry groups
and individual parties to negotiate, additional disclosures could
be an integral part of the design.
Depending on the proposed CCS design, concerns over
SIFIs or central banks buying CCS issued by systemically signifi-
cant financial institutions could be raised. If SIFIs were to hold
CCS issued by competitors, it is possible they would not act in the
best interest of their competitors as equity holders after conver-
sion. Similarly, if SIFIs should be allowed to purchase the CCS of
their competitors, the management accountability and risk con-
trol incentives of CCS,"' before and after conversion, could be
distorted.
An outright ban of SIFI CCS purchases, or at least purchases
in other SIFI CCS issuances, could be detrimental for CCS mar-
ket evolution. Perhaps a mechanism that requires disclosure of
the identity of the purchaser for SIFIs and approval by the issuer
could address these concerns. Disclosure of CCS purchasers
would allow the issuing SIFI to decide if it would be in their inter-
est to give a competitor a substantial CCS position that could give
the competitor voting rights as equity holders upon conversion.
It is unclear if CCS could be part of investment strategies that
would require minimal disclosure to other market participants.
If the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, the European Central
Bank, and other central banks, as part of their monetary policy,
were to purchase CCS issued by SIFIs in the primary or secondary
market, the prospect of internalizing bank failure costs could be
246. Johnson, supra note 222, at 38-39.
247. See supra Part V.
248. See supra Part IV.
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undermined. Central bank purchases in the primary market
could also undermine market participants' confidence in these
instruments. Central bank purchases in the primary and secon-
dary market could mean the total loss of the investment in these
securities if conversion should be unsuccessful and the SIFI
defaults. Central banks, in this potential scenario, could be pro-
viding two instances of bailout funding, one through CCS
purchases, and another through their implied commitment to
provide liquidity if the CCS proved unsuccessful and the SIFI
remains in financial difficulty. This could multiply the negative
effects of government bailouts for SIFIs.
The implicit guarantees in a bailout in combination with
central bank purchases of CCS could incentivize SIFIs' increase
of leverage. Increased leverage of SIFIs has the potential to
increase the overall supply of money and could increase asset
price distortions while hiding the mispricing of risk. Govern-
ments already prioritize SIFI bailouts over other entities because
of potential systemic implications. Combining bailout prioritiza-
tion with central bank CCS purchases in a given jurisdiction
could further incentivize SIFIs to adopt similar risk profiles and
correlate risks. From this perspective, banning central bank
purchases of CCS could be a policy option. An outright ban on
central bank CCS purchases, however, could also inappropriately
limit the regulatory tools available to central banks. Given the
systemic importance of SIFIs, legislators in the United States and
abroad could be hesitant to curtail central banks' discretion in
this context.
If the government subsidizes SIFIs through the implied avail-
ability of bailout funds and through potential CCS purchases, it
could be critical for the government to use counter-subsidies.
Without counter-subsidies, the potential negative economic
effects of government bailouts could result in significant social
cost. One way to counter-subsidize government funding could
be to charge banks for actions taken by the regulator.
Another possibility for a counter-subsidy could be a retroactive
charge for government bailout funding received by SIFIs. On
the other hand, an outright retroactive charge for government
subsidies or actions taken by regulators could actually legitimize
the bailout and perpetuate its socially suboptimal consequences.
The issuance of CCS to private parties could make counter-
subsidy considerations unnecessary if the internalization of bank
249. For a discussion on the subject of paying regulators, see Frederick
Tung & M. Todd Henderson, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive
Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012).
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failure cost should be accomplished with these securities.
Whether the potential of CCS can be fulfilled could depend on
the design features and their convergence across jurisdictions.
VIII. CONCLusION
The design of contingent capital securities in various juris-
dictions could have a substantial effect on financial markets,
moral hazard, future bailouts, risk taking by SIFI managers, and
the perception of systemic and operational risk in SIFIs. Most of
the design features of CCS are still underdeveloped. The nas-
cent market in contingent capital securities, in combination with
the regulatory evaluation of CCS in various jurisdictions, could
be an opportunity to consider contingent capital designs that
help reform the corporate governance structure of SIFIs.
Because technical features of contingent capital designs are
underdeveloped, experimentation with contingent capital
designs could include parameters that have the potential to max-
imize social welfare. The experimentation with different CCS
rules and a mixture of market solutions, private ordering, and
mandatory rules in different jurisdictions could allow for
dynamic regulation. As the design features become more pro-
nounced and their scope and impact become clearer, so may
their potential to help reform corporate governance in SIFIs.
Contingent capital could help facilitate an incentive structure
that allows regulators to rely partially on private party contracting
for the design of CCS to account for systemic risk. The prelimi-
nary evaluation of contingent capital as corporate governance
reform in this Article suggests that additional research is needed.
